

NEGOTIATING RACE: MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY
IN MULTIETHNIC STATES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2015

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 12-06-2015		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2014 – JUN 2015	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Negotiating Race: Military Manpower Policy in Multiethnic States				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Shi Ming Wong				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT States that discriminate against ethnic groups face a daunting dilemma: the state demands military service but mistrusts certain ethnicities. Some militaries brutalize ethnic recruits; most deny them equal opportunity or rights. This thesis investigates how ethnic and military leaders influence politicians to determine the size and character of ethnic participation in the armed forces, by comparing the experiences of marginalized groups in the US, former Soviet Union, South Africa and Israel. The research found that multiethnic states amend their military manpower policy through a two-stage process. In the first stage, ethnic and military leaders independently decide whether to press for changes to existing policies, based on their capability status and whether there is legitimacy in advocating for change. The second stage of the theory builds upon the first by examining how ethnic, military and political leaders negotiate with one another to change military manpower policy. The case studies indicated that the nature and pace of ethnic integration are determined critically by the power differentials of the various actors, as well as their rational calculation of the costs and benefits incurred from pursuing integration. The research highlights the importance for all stakeholders to have a balanced stake in the evolution of military manpower policy, as this produces negotiating outcomes with net positive gains for all parties involved. Politicians that give both ethnic and military leaderships a fair role in the bargaining process can simultaneously enhance the effectiveness of the military as well as alleviate some of the tensions between the state and its marginalized ethnic groups.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Ethnic discrimination, ethnic integration, equal opportunity, minority rights, military manpower policy, negotiations, multiethnic state					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			(U)	145	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

NEGOTIATING RACE: MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY IN MULTIETHNIC STATES, by Major Shi Ming Wong, 145 pages.

States that discriminate against ethnic groups face a daunting dilemma: the state demands military service but mistrusts certain ethnicities. Some militaries brutalize ethnic recruits; most deny them equal opportunity or rights. This thesis investigates how ethnic and military leaders influence politicians to determine the size and character of ethnic participation in the armed forces, by comparing the experiences of marginalized groups in the US, former Soviet Union, South Africa and Israel.

The research found that multiethnic states amend their military manpower policy through a two-stage process. In the first stage, ethnic and military leaders independently decide whether to press for changes to existing policies, based on their capability status and whether there is legitimacy in advocating for change. The second stage of the theory builds upon the first by examining how ethnic, military and political leaders negotiate with one another to determine changes in military manpower policy. The case studies indicated that the nature and pace of ethnic integration are determined critically by the power differentials of the various actors, as well as their rational calculation of the costs and benefits incurred from pursuing integration.

The research highlights the importance for all stakeholders to have a balanced stake in the evolution of military manpower policy, as this produces negotiating outcomes with net positive gains for all parties involved. Politicians that give both ethnic and military leaderships a fair role in the bargaining process can simultaneously enhance the effectiveness of the military as well as alleviate some of the tensions between the state and its marginalized ethnic groups.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My wife, Jasmine, has been a staunch pillar of support throughout the course of the year. Her patience and encouragement, especially during the most difficult hours, gave me the energy necessary to complete the thesis.

My thesis committee comprising Dr David Anderson, Dr Dale Spurlin, and Mr Douglas Stephensen provided useful insights and suggestions, while allowing me considerable freedom to scope my research. They contributed much to the final product though I take sole responsibility for its shortcomings.

The staff at the Graduate Degree Programs office and the Combined Arms Research Library worked closely with me and provided excellent support as I pursued my research. Their dedication to students will continue to inspire me throughout my academic and professional career.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE OF ETHNIC-MILITARY
MANPOWER POLICY

In 1948, when the pro-apartheid South African National Party swept to power, it declared its policy concerning the role of blacks in the South African Defense Force (SADF): “Africans should not be in a position, by virtue of military training and the possession of modern arms, to challenge effectively the asymmetrical balance of power between the Africans and the whites.”¹ Black soldiers were disarmed, and black military units disbanded, in an all-out effort to prevent the militarization of the natives. Black servicemen who remained in the military were assigned to noncombat positions and had virtually no prospects for promotion.

By the late 1970s, however, a very different picture had emerged in the SADF. The percentage of black soldiers in the armed forces had increased precipitously from 5 percent in the 1950s to almost 30 percent in the late 1970s. Blacks were put in combat positions, inducted into officer school, and became viewed as an integral part of the SADF. What had caused these dramatic changes to occur in a country that, at that time, still firmly embraced apartheid?

Half a world apart, the state of Israel became independent in 1948, the same year the South African National Party came to power. Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, proclaimed that integration would be a key priority for the fledgling country,

¹ Richard Dale, “The Legacy of the Imperial-Commonwealth Connection,” in *Defense Policy Formation—Towards Comparative Analysis*, ed., James Roherty (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1980), 79.

vowing to “blend in a melting pot various diaspora immigrants and communities that differ from us to create a new unified nation.”² The army alone, he argued, could be “an integrating institution to create the new character of the nation.”³ Yet, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Oriental Jews continued to be assigned to low-prestige military vocations that performed menial jobs, and soldiers from the Druze ethnic group were made to serve in segregated minority units in the Israeli Defense Force.⁴ Why did Israel, for two decades after its independence, continue to have a military that discriminated against segments of its population, despite the official position that ethnic integration was a key national priority? What caused the country to reverse its discriminatory practices subsequently?

The contrasting and counter-intuitive experiences of South Africa and Israel highlight the central question that will be addressed in this thesis: In ethnically stratified states, how do ethnic and military leaders influence political leaders to determine the size and character of ethnic participation in the armed forces? This thesis seeks to answer the question by presenting a two-stage theory that explains how military manpower policy is amended in multiethnic states.

The central theme of this thesis is that ethnic, military and political leaders respond to institutional structures and incentives in different ways to determine the size and character of ethnic participation in the military. The first stage of the theory examines

² Israel National Legislature, *Records of the Knesset* 2 (August 15, 1949), 1338.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ze’ev Schliff, *A History of the Israeli Army, 1874 to the Present* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1987), 54-55.

the conditions that lead ethnic and military leaders to pressure the political leadership for changes in military manpower policy. It is argued that ethnic and military leaders will only push for integration when they have the capability, as well as legitimate grounds, to do so.

The second stage of the theory builds upon the first by examining how ethnic and military leaders interact with one another, as well as the political leadership, in amending military manpower policy. Three facets of this interaction are analyzed. First, who will be the dominant player in the bargaining game? Second, what is the role of the political leadership? Third, what are the outcomes of the changes in ethnic-military manpower policy? Collectively, the two stages of the theory will explain how states amend their ethnic-military manpower policy, and why marginalized ethnicities are integrated in the armed forces of some countries but not in others.

The Importance of the Issue

Ethnicity has always been an important factor in determining how an individual is treated in the military, both in ancient empires and in modern states.⁵ During the reign of Ivan the Terrible from 1547 to 1584, Tartar soldiers were given preference in promotion over Russian soldiers.⁶ Similarly, up until the 1950s, black soldiers were systematically discriminated against in the US military. Ethnic discrimination occurs in the militaries of both developed countries (e.g. Switzerland, Israel) and developing countries (e.g. China,

⁵ Cynthia Enloe, *Police, Military and Ethnicity: Foundations of State Power* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1980), 6.

⁶ Alexander Alexiev and Enders Wimbush, *Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 14.

Pakistan).⁷ Yet, despite the pervasiveness of this phenomenon, which has affected the lives of millions of ethnic youth, we still know very little about what determines the size and character of ethnic participation in the armed forces.

Such discrimination produces consequences that reverberate beyond the realm of the military. About half of the world's countries still practice conscription, and in these states, participation in the armed forces has often been depicted as a sign of one's full membership in the political community as well as evidence of one's worthiness to be treated as an equal citizen.⁸ If members of subordinated ethnic groups feel that the state cannot trust them, and if the rest of society perceives them as "free riders" who do not contribute to the nation, then the country becomes increasingly fractured and drifts apart. The study of ethnic-military manpower policy is therefore also a study of nation building and citizenship.

If ethnic-military manpower policy has important implications on the nation in peacetime, it can have devastating consequences in wartime. Divided societies are hampered in their ability to project military power.⁹ During the 1991 Gulf War, the unconditional surrender of thousands of frontline Iraqi soldiers was due as much to the failure by the Saddam government to manage the complex problems resulting from the Iraqi military's multiethnic composition, as it was to the overwhelming firepower of the

⁷ Enloe, 15.

⁸ Ronald Krebs, *Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 17.

⁹ See Stephen Peter Rosen, *Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

Allied forces.¹⁰ A hastily assembled multitude of soldiers from various ethnic groups may be called a military, but if the military organization is not internally cohesive and its soldiers are not motivated to fight, then it is doomed to fail in war.

Thus, the field of ethnic-military manpower policy is an important area of study, as problems arising from ethnic discrimination in the military can adversely affect a multiethnic state during both peacetime and wartime. However, there is a paucity of scholarly research in this area, due in part to the sensitive nature of the issues at hand and the difficulty of obtaining reliable empirical data. We know too little about how states integrate and promote members of marginalized ethnicities in the armed forces; how and why military organizations become ethnically integrated; and what features characterize a military organization that successfully integrates, or one that fails to do so. Yet, these are the questions that determine the success of multiethnic militaries in times of war, and the unity of multiethnic states in times of peace. Today, politicians, military officers, and ethnic leaders across the world continue to struggle with issues of ethnic-military manpower policy, with very little academic insight available to guide them. The issues that are examined in this thesis are intended to contribute to this neglected – yet vital – field of military manpower study.

Defining the Key Concepts

Throughout this study, certain terms will be used that need to be first defined. “Ethnic groups” are a distinct category of the population with a culture different from that of the larger society, with its members bound together by common ties of race, language,

¹⁰ US News and World Report, *Triumph without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War* (New York: Random House, 1992), 320.

or culture.¹¹ Max Weber argues that members of a given ethnic group do not necessarily need to share objective blood ties—as long as members “entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both,” they can consider themselves part of the same ethnic group.¹²

“Multiethnic states” are characterized by the co-existence of several principal cohesive and enduring ethnic groups. Sometimes, these states are ethnically stratified, where the various ethnic groups are hierarchically ranked according to their differential access to political and economic resources.¹³ The political agenda of ethnically stratified states is often dominated by sharp tensions between the politically dominant and subordinate ethnic groups.

In this thesis, the term “ethnic leaders” will be used to refer to the indigenous political leadership of marginalized ethnic groups. Similarly, the term “ethnic youth” and “ethnic soldiers” will describe the young members of such groups who serve in the military. “Ethnic units” will refer to military units where the vast majority of soldiers belong to such politically and economically subordinated ethnic communities.¹⁴

The two other actors that will be frequently discussed in this thesis are “military leaders” and “political leaders.” Military leaders are senior officers who run the military. They include the service chiefs, top generals, and other pinnacle appointment holders in

¹¹ H. S. Morris, “Ethnic Groups,” *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 5 (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 167.

¹² Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (New York: Bedminister Press, 1968), 35.

¹³ Morris, 169.

¹⁴ Alon Peled, *A Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower Policy in Multiethnic States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 7.

the military. Military leaders run the armed forces by virtue of their military rank. This is in contrast to “political leaders,” such as the President, Prime Minister, or the Secretary of Defense, who exercise civilian control of the military. As Samuel Huntington points out, the degree of civilian control exercised by the political leadership over the military depends on the nature of civil-military relations, which can vary widely from country to country.¹⁵

Ethnic, military, and political leaders interact to amend ethnic-military manpower policy. “Ethnic-military manpower policy” refers to an array of political decisions concerning the integration of ethnic youth into the military.¹⁶ It includes decisions concerning which ethnic groups to allow in which sectors of the military, the likelihood that members of particular ethnic groups will be promoted in rank, the terms of service, and the kind of military missions in which ethnic soldiers will be employed.

In this study, the term “integration” will refer to the process where discriminatory practices against marginalized ethnicities in the armed forces are discontinued. This process can occur in two ways. The first is horizontal integration, where marginalized ethnicities are allowed to enter into military vocations or services that were previously closed off to them. This may culminate into the abolition of separate ethnic military units and the deployment of ethnic soldiers in sensitive military missions alongside members of the dominant ethnic group. Horizontal integration will usually lead to the second form of integration, vertical integration. This is a process where ethnic youth are given the

¹⁵ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

¹⁶ Peled, *A Question of Loyalty*, 12.

same opportunities as the dominant ethnic group to be promoted to officer or specialist rank. Vertical integration usually culminates into the promotion of a significant group of junior ethnic officers to field grade ranks, and ultimately to senior positions that assume command of large-scale, non-ethnic combat formations.¹⁷

Literature Review

Early scholars of civil-military relations such as Samuel Huntington have analyzed the power dynamics that exist between the civilian political leadership and the military leadership, but they have paid little attention to how the relationship between the two actors affects the internal ethnic structure of military organizations.¹⁸ In the early 1960s, the eminent civil-military theorist, Morris Janowitz, began to address the issue of ethnic participation in the armed forces. He argued that the recruitment of ethnic soldiers to the military would have a positive impact as it would increase the civic consciousness of the ethnic soldiers and contribute to the nation-building process. Janowitz added that the armed forces could be seen as an institution for unifying the different ethnic groups within a multiethnic country.¹⁹

During the 1970s, a growing number of scholars began to question Janowitz's normative arguments. Cynthia Enloe portrayed the military as a weak nation-builder, and argued that ethnic groups were, in reality, passive subjects of military manpower manipulation. According to Enloe, "state elites" do not conscript ethnic soldiers in order

¹⁷ Peled, *A Question of Loyalty*, 17.

¹⁸ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*.

¹⁹ Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 80-81.

to foster a sense of national unity. Rather, these distrusted ethnic groups are only called upon to serve in the military as a last resort: “We can just as fruitfully analyze conscription [of ethnic soldiers] as a central elite’s last-resort solution to the problem of obtaining sufficient manpower.”²⁰ Kenneth Grundy echoes Enloe’s cynicism about the nature of ethnic participation in the military by arguing that governments place restrictions on certain ethnic groups in the armed forces in order to make it easier for the dominant ethnic group to divide and rule, and to “thwart the expression of unified anti-regime activity.”²¹ For scholars like Enloe and Grundy, it is the government’s self-interest that determines ethnic participation in multiethnic states.

Whether ethnic-military manpower policy is constructed to fulfill the benign goal of nation building (Janowitz), or to satisfy the self-interested aims of state elites (Enloe, Grundy), both schools of thought leave many questions unanswered. While they provide competing explanations for how ethnic-military manpower policy is constructed, neither school of thought analyzes how such policies are subsequently amended. After their initial creation, how do changes in military manpower policy occur—and why do we see such changes in some countries but not in others?

Additionally, both schools of thought present ethnic-military manpower policy as being determined by state elites, but they do not tease apart the constituent components of this concept. Who are the state elites? Politicians, military and ethnic leaders are all presumably part of the state elites, but can they all be lumped together and assumed to

²⁰ Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1980), 53.

²¹ Kenneth Grundy, *Soldiers Without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 278-279.

behave as a monolithic decision-making entity? Are they all equally influential in determining ethnic participation in the military? In reality, we see that these three actors often have very different motivations and capabilities, thus conflating them into a singular concept of state elites does not illuminate the dynamics played by each actor. It is the complex interplay of their interactions in the negotiating process that determines how ethnic-military manpower policy is both constructed and amended.

In subsequent works on minority rights and the politics of military service, scholars began to explore the process by which military manpower policy is amended in multiethnic states. Ronald Krebs, for example, examined how minority groups can successfully lobby the “state” for ethnic integration in the armed forces.²² His research reveals that minority groups that employ rhetorical devices that fit in with the prevailing citizenship discourse of “civic virtue” are more likely to succeed when they press for equal treatment in the military. While Krebs’ research provides an insight into the factors that affect the success of minority group lobbying, his use of “rhetorical choices” and “frames of reference” as the major explanatory variables in determining the success of minority group activism is an unsatisfactory attempt at explaining how military manpower policy is amended. Krebs’ argument assumes that changes result when ethnic leaders bargain with the political elite, but it makes no mention about the role played by military leaders in the process of change. Krebs also places an excessive emphasis on a cultural approach to explaining why certain minority group advocacy succeeds (e.g. “rhetorical devices that fit in with prevailing citizenship discourse”), at the expense of a

²² Ronald Krebs, *Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 17.

rationalist consideration of the material factors (e.g. resources of ethnic groups) that can frequently affect the success of minority group activism.²³

In contrast to Krebs' focus on ideational factors, Alon Peled adopted a material-based approach and offered new perspectives on how ethnic-military manpower policy is constructed based on negotiations among the principal actors.²⁴ Drawing on extensive interviews with senior officers and top policymakers in Israel, South Africa and Singapore, Peled's work produced a large volume of new information concerning the systematic exclusion of ethnic soldiers in the armed forces of these countries.

Peled's work makes three important contributions to the scholarly literature. First, he suggests that the construction of ethnic-military manpower policy is best explained by the national ideology of the country in question. Second, he breaks down the monolithic concept of "state elites" and argues that over time, ethnic-military manpower policy evolves through an intricate bargaining game between politicians who fear disloyal ethnic soldiers within the military, military officers who seek to enhance the combat performance of their troops, and ethnic leaders who endeavor to promote the status of their groups within the state. Peled's disaggregation of the state elites into three separate actors—politicians, military leaders, and ethnic leaders—and his analysis of the different agenda that each actor possesses, is an important theoretical step forward. Third, he provides a significant amount of fresh primary evidence that details the thinking of top policymakers in Israel, South Africa and Singapore when they construct ethnic-military manpower policy.

²³ Krebs, 17.

²⁴ Peled, *A Question of Loyalty*, 5-10.

Even though these are important contributions to the scholarly literature, there are still several major gaps in Peled's work that this thesis seeks to address. First, while Peled makes a convincing case that changing ethnic-military manpower policy is important to politicians, ethnic and military leaders for different reasons, he does not explain when each of the actors will push for change. Why is it only during particular moments in a nation's history that military and ethnic leaders press for integration? What are these "moments" that make ethnic-military manpower policy ripe for change? Peled makes a fine attempt at analyzing the different goals of each of the three actors, but he fails to explain the circumstances and the conditions that motivate ethnic and military leaders to press the political leadership for change.

Second, while Peled examines how ethnic and military leaders will bargain with each other based on their separate agendas and reach "compromises" on changes in military manpower policy, he does not explain what happens when there are power differentials between the two actors. If military leaders are more influential than ethnic leaders, or vice versa, what will the interaction between the two actors look like? What effects do these skewed interactions have on the ensuing policy outcomes? Finally, what happens when both actors are equally powerful, giving rise to a deadlock in the bargaining? These questions on power differentials are critical to a meaningful discussion of what the negotiations between the major actors will look like, yet they remain unanswered in Peled's work.

Third, Peled does not provide a framework for understanding the relationship that the political leadership has with the ethnic and military leaderships. When does the role of the political leadership become salient in determining changes in military manpower

policy? What does the political leadership do when there is a deadlock between the ethnic and military leaderships, and what happens to the politicians when one of these two actors becomes disproportionately powerful?²⁵ These questions remain unresolved by Peled. Instead, he simply portrays politicians as actors whose main priority is to secure the loyalty of the armed forces.

Fourth, Peled does not address how the interactions between the various actors to bring about changes in ethnic-military manpower policy may produce different consequences to society. For example, do military-directed changes in military manpower policy generate the same effects or consequences as ethnic-directed changes? This thesis will attempt to address this gap in the scholarly literature.

Finally, Peled's theoretical arguments are descriptive in nature, using the benefit of hindsight to explain the role of individual actors in determining ethnic-military manpower policy. Such explanations are piecemeal and he does not provide a theoretically understandable finding that allows scholars to make general predictions on how ethnic-military manpower policy will evolve based on different dependent variables. This thesis attempts to address this weakness, by providing a simple model that allows academics and policymakers alike to examine how military manpower policy will be amended based on the different characteristics of ethnic, military, and political leaders in a particular state.

²⁵ See Arnold Kanter, *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979); Deborah Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), for an analysis of how the civilian political administration's influence in defense policy becomes most salient when a deadlock occurs between different services in the armed forces.

In sum, this thesis seeks to address five principal gaps in the current literature on ethnic-military manpower policy: a failure to explain the circumstances under which military and ethnic leaders will press for change; a lack of discussion on how power differentials between the principal actors affect the results of bargaining; the portrayal of the political leadership as a static actor; the inability to explain the societal consequences arising from changes in military manpower policy; and the absence of a model that provides a theoretically understandable finding for how military manpower policy is amended in multiethnic states.

Plan of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 together introduce the theoretical framework that will guide the empirical discussions. In chapter 2 specifically, a theory of why and how multiethnic states amend their military manpower policy is presented, based on a set of rational-strategic hypotheses. The first stage of the theory explains the conditions under which military and ethnic leaders will, or will not, want to press the political leadership for shifts in military manpower policy. It is argued that ethnic and military leaders will only push for changes when they have high capabilities, and when there are legitimate grounds to do so. Building on this argument, the chapter then introduces the second stage of the theory, which explains how ethnic and military leaders interact with the political leadership to determine the size and character of ethnic participation in the armed forces. A model depicting the complex interaction that takes place between the three actors is presented, showing how they may combine to speed or block shifts in military utilization of ethnic soldiers. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the methodology used to test the validity of the model. The thesis adopts

the case study approach, where empirical historical episodes are used to examine the plausibility of the theoretical hypotheses about actor attempts and interactive episodes.

In chapter 3, the first stage of the theory is tested. Case studies from the US, South Africa, and Israel are used to examine the conditions under which ethnic and military leaders will press for changes in military manpower policy. These case studies are then compared to the first stage of the theory, to examine if it holds true under empirical scrutiny. Besides assessing whether the theory meets expectations, the thesis also speaks of the added complexities—beyond those previously theorized—that the case episodes suggest.

Chapter 4 tests the second stage of the theory, which explains how ethnic and military leaders interact with the political leadership to amend military manpower policy. Case studies from Israel, the US, South Africa, and the former Soviet Union are used to test the validity of the second-stage theory. Specifically, three facets of the interaction are analyzed: the nature of the interaction between ethnic and military leaders, the role played by the political leadership, and the outcomes of the changes in ethnic-military manpower policy. Collectively, the four case studies will be used to assess if the second stage of the theory is robust upon empirical examination.

Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by revisiting some older themes and taking up some new ones. It summarizes the theoretical logic and empirical findings that have been presented, and explains the significance behind the conclusions that are drawn. The chapter also highlights both the implications and utility of the study, and suggests areas where further research can be conducted to supplement the arguments that have been presented in this thesis.

CHAPTER 2

THEORY: EXPLAINING CHANGES IN ETHNIC-MILITARY MANPOWER POLICY

This thesis asks a simple but important question: why and how is military manpower policy amended in multiethnic states? This chapter sketches a theory that seeks to answer that question.

Let us assume that there are two key actors—military leaders and ethnic leaders—who apply pressure on the political leadership for shifts in the military’s utilization of ethnic soldiers.²⁶ In the first stage of the theory, we examine how these two actors independently decide whether to press the political leadership for change.

Once these decisions are made, the second stage of the theory becomes relevant: how do ethnic and military leaders interact with each other, and the political leadership, to determine the size and character of ethnic participation in the armed forces? This thesis will study three facets of this interaction. First, who will be the dominant player in the bargaining game? Second, what is the role of the political leadership? Third, what are the outcomes of the changes in ethnic-military manpower policy? Collectively, the two stages of the theory will explain why and how military manpower policy is amended in multiethnic states, and highlight some of the salient characteristics that determine both the nature and the outcome of such changes.

²⁶ This builds upon the work of Peled, who had disaggregated the concept of “state elite” into three actors (military, ethnic and political). However, Peled does not explain the conditions under which the actors will push for change, and neither does he articulate how power differentials between the actors affect the outcome of the negotiating process. Peled, *A Question of Loyalty*, 23.

Stage 1: The Conditions for Change

This thesis assumes that two key variables determine if military and ethnic leaders will press for the integration of marginalized ethnicities into the armed forces.

Variable 1: Capability of the Actor

“Capability of the actor” refers to the political power of the actor (military or ethnic leaders) to promote one solution over another. It can be based on the degree of political influence that the actor possesses, or it can be based on the autonomy that an actor has to make its own decisions. Regardless, capability is a material concept—measured by the degree of power and resources wielded by an actor to promote its preferred solution. The specific tools used to measure capability will be addressed later.

Variable 2: Legitimacy in Advocating for Integration

Legitimacy refers to the perceived fairness of integrating ethnic soldiers into the armed forces. It is an ideational concept—the perceptions in people’s minds. Precipitous increases in legitimacy can arise if marginalized ethnicities contributed substantially to the success of war efforts, or if they are expected to be valuable to the military in the future. More gradual increases in legitimacy can result from a general elevation of the status of marginalized ethnic groups in society, but this is usually a long-term process.

Applying the variables to the actors: Military Leaders

A valid assumption is that military leaders are functionally rational actors.²⁷ Their actions are directed towards maximizing the strength of the military organization—and

²⁷ An actor that is “functionally rational” directs his actions towards the maximization of a particular preference function.

they are uninfluenced by anything else, including the structures of societies from which they emerge. Max Weber was the scholar who first espoused this assumption, arguing in “The Meaning of Discipline” that rational discipline in the military leadership would and should override loyalties to general social structures.²⁸ Following Weber, other scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Stephen Rosen have further elaborated on this claim. Huntington, for instance, argues that history is replete with examples of “professional” military officers who do not meddle in political affairs and who focus exclusively on their duties of being “managers of violence.”²⁹ Rosen corroborates Huntington’s claim by arguing that while societies are uncomfortable with military leaders who make policies that do not reflect the dominant characteristics of their societies, “empirically we know that such isolation and professionalism [of military leaders] can be achieved, even under difficult circumstances.”³⁰ In this thesis, it will thus be assumed that military leaders adhere to the conception of the “professional” military officer described by Weber, Huntington, and Rosen.

When Will Military Leaders Press for Change?

Based on the assumption that military leaders are functionally rational actors who make decisions based on the Weberian principle of maximizing the military’s effectiveness, it logically follows that the legitimacy for military leaders in advocating for

²⁸ Max Weber, “The Meaning of Discipline,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, eds. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 256.

²⁹ Huntington, 17-25.

³⁰ Stephen Rosen, *Societies and Military Power* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 7.

the integration of marginalized ethnicities depends on the perceived military value that ethnic soldiers bring to the military organization. If ethnic soldiers are perceived as being militarily valuable, such that they increase the military's ability to project its power, then military leaders will have highly legitimate grounds in advocating for their integration. Such military value can be inferred if ethnic soldiers have proven themselves to be useful to the armed forces in the past (e.g. they have performed well in battle), or if military leaders expect that these marginalized ethnicities will be useful to the armed forces in the future, especially if more recruits are needed.

For military leaders, their capability or their power to promote one solution over another is largely a function of their autonomy from the civilian political leadership. Military leaderships that are highly autonomous vis-à-vis the civilian leadership can be described as having “high capability,” as an autonomous military leadership is likely to be able to make decisions independent of interference from the civilian apparatus. Military leaderships that have high capability (i.e. highly autonomous) fulfill the following two conditions:³¹

1. It has the authority to handle and set its own organizational policies, doctrinal practices, and administrative affairs;
2. It has the authority to select and promote its own senior military officers.

A hypothesis is that military leaders must possess high capabilities and must perceive high legitimacy in order for them to be a driving force in pushing for the integration of marginalized ethnicities in the armed forces. This is depicted as follows.

³¹ These two indicators were used by Samuel Huntington to assess the level of autonomy possessed by the US military. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 401-408.

Table 1. Conditions for Military Leaders to Press for Change

		Capability of Military Leaders	
		Low	High
Military Leaders' Legitimacy in Advocating for Integration	Low	1. No demand for integration from military leadership (Inactive)	2. Military leaders do not push for integration because integration is not in accordance with organizational interests (Inactive)
	High	3. Military leaders will want to push for integration, but they do not have the ability or the clout to do so (Inactive)	4. Military leaders are a driving force in agitating for integration (Driving force)

Source: Created by author.

Applying the variables to the actors: Ethnic Leaders

This thesis assumes that ethnic leaders—like military leaders—are functionally rational actors. Their actions are directed towards maintaining their position as leaders of their ethnic community, and remaining in control of their kinsmen. In order to satisfy this preference function, ethnic leaders must gain the support of their kinsmen and fight for their rights, including the right to be treated equally in the armed forces.

When Will Ethnic Leaders Press for Change?

Several scholars have argued that ethnic leaders will only “fight for rights” when they perceive that they have legitimate claims. For example, Perelman argues that “[the demand for minority rights] cannot be imposed unilaterally or through the exercise of material power alone . . . the effort necessarily implicates some public audience in the process, and thus all parties continually strive to legitimate their positions in the eyes of

the public.”³² Krebs affirms this by suggesting that “minorities [who are discriminated against] must decide whether to mobilize or remain quiescent,” with the “cost of each strategy” being dependent on how legitimate their claims are.³³ After all, the political contest to fight for minority rights is usually very costly. Ethnic leaders who press for the integration of their kinsmen into the military are likely to encounter opposition from various sectors of society who are not yet ready to give equal rights to the marginalized ethnicities. If these demands for integration are perceived as illegitimate, ethnic leaders will have to incur very high costs in attempting to convince a resistant audience about the validity of their claims, while being uncertain about their chances of success.

For ethnic leaders, their capability is largely a function of their degree of political influence. Ethnic leaders who have substantial political influence are deemed as having “high capability” as they are more likely to succeed in achieving their political goals. In this thesis, ethnic leaders have high capability if they meet both the following conditions:

1. Ethnic groups are effectively represented in the parliament or in senior levels of government, or have strong connections with senior government officials;
2. Ethnic groups have the ability to use institutional mechanisms (e.g. elections) to affect the composition of government, should their demands go unfulfilled.

A hypothesis is that ethnic leaders must possess high capabilities and must perceive high legitimacy in order for them to be a driving force in pressing for the integration of marginalized ethnicities in the armed forces.

³² Chaim Perelman, *The Realm of Rhetoric* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 58.

³³ Ronald Krebs, *Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 29.

Table 2. Conditions for Ethnic Leaders to Press for Change

		Capability of Ethnic Leaders	
		Low	High
Ethnic Leaders' Legitimacy in Advocating for Integration	Low	1. No demand for integration from ethnic leadership (Inactive)	2. Ethnic leaders do not press for integration because such demands are perceived as illegitimate and thus costly for ethnic leaders (Inactive)
	High	3. Ethnic leaders will want to press for integration, but they do not have the ability or the clout to do so (Inactive)	4. Ethnic leaders are a driving force in pressing for integration (Driving force)

Source: Created by author.

Having proposed a theory of the conditions under which military and ethnic leaders will decide to advocate for change, this thesis now proceeds to the second stage of the theory, which examines the complex interaction between these two actors and the political leadership in the negotiating process.

Stage 2: The Dynamics of Interaction

Building upon the results from Stage 1, the following model depicts the interaction in the second stage of the theory. In each negotiating scenario, it suggests the dominant player, the role of the political leadership, and the societal effects arising from changes in military manpower policy.

Table 3. How Military, Ethnic and Political Leaders Interact to Change Ethnic-Military Manpower Policy

		Military Leadership	
		Inactive	Driving force
Ethnic Leadership	Inactive	<p>A: No impetus for change from either military or ethnic leadership</p> <p>B: Political leadership assumes decisive role. Lack of pressure for change from ethnic or military leadership means status quo will be maintained</p> <p>C: No change in ethnic-military manpower policy; discrimination in the armed forces persists</p>	<p>A: Impetus for change is likely to come from military leadership</p> <p>B: Political leadership is likely to yield to the demands of the military leadership</p> <p>C: Changes in ethnic-military manpower policy are likely to be military-directed; integration in armed forces occurs at a faster pace than what society can accept</p>
	Driving force	<p>A: Impetus for change is likely to come from ethnic leadership</p> <p>B: Political leadership is likely to yield to the demands of the ethnic leadership</p> <p>C: Changes in ethnic-military manpower policy are likely to be socially-directed; integration in armed forces occurs at a faster pace than what the military can accept</p>	<p>A: Impetus for change comes from both military and ethnic leaderships</p> <p>B: Political leadership is likely to adjudicate when conflicting demands arise from military and ethnic leaderships</p> <p>C: Creative compromises in ethnic-military manpower policy are likely to occur between military and ethnic leaderships</p>

A: Nature of the change in ethnic-military manpower policy—Describes the preponderant source, or cause, of the change

B: Role of political leadership in the change process—Describes how the political leadership is likely to respond to pressures coming from the military and/or ethnic leadership

C: Outcomes of the change in ethnic-military manpower policy—Indicates the effects of the change in the near-term. It does not consider the long-term results of the change because there are too many mitigating factors to consider in the long run.

Source: Created by author.

The Role of the Political Leadership

We have thus far explained the role played by ethnic and military leaders in amending military manpower policy, but what about the political leadership? What role does it play?

This thesis will assume that political leaders are functionally rational actors—their actions are directed towards the purpose of preserving their political power and maintaining their position as leaders of the country. In the case of democratic countries, they aim to distribute public goods in order to ensure re-election. For autocratic polities, a political leader will strive to appease his cronies to ensure that they do not overthrow him.

Based on this rational actor framework, it is posited that political leaders will act in different ways depending on the status of ethnic and military leaders in the state:

1. In states where both military and ethnic leaders are inactive in pushing for integration, the political leadership is likely to play a decisive role in steering policies. This is because it encounters no resistance from the military and ethnic leaders, who have neither the capacity nor the will to oppose any existing policies. As such, the political leadership faces no incentive or pressure to change, and ethnic discrimination in the military is likely to be maintained.
2. In states where the ethnic leadership is a driving force and the military leadership is inactive, ethnic leaders are influential, while the military remains weak. Ethnic leaders can use their influence in the political community and the threat of the ballot box to push for integration. In such circumstances, the

rational political leadership is likely to yield to the demands of the ethnic leaders, in order to ensure re-election.³⁴

3. In states where the military leadership is the driving force and the ethnic leadership is inactive, it is likely that a highly autonomous military exists that has a monopoly on the means of organized violence in the state. Such militaries are common in countries such as Thailand and Pakistan, and they have frequently toppled civilian governments through coup d'états or other forms of violent insurrection.³⁵ Faced with such a highly autonomous military, a rational political leadership that aims to preserve its survival is likely to yield to the demands of the military leadership where possible. Hence, when the military leadership presses for the integration of marginalized ethnicities into the armed forces, the political leadership is likely to yield to its demands.
4. In states where both the military and ethnic leaderships are driving forces, both military and ethnic leaders are powerful actors that can influence the political process. While ethnic and military leaders may both agree on the necessity of integration, their interests may not overlap all the time. For instance, they may differ on the nature or the pace of integration. If both ethnic and military leaders reach a deadlock in areas of disagreement, it is posited that the political

³⁴ This analysis applies only to democratic regimes. In non-democratic regimes, ethnic minorities do not have the right to vote nor have a voice in the political process, so it is not possible for ethnic leaders in these regimes to have high capability or to be a driving force for change.

³⁵ Thailand has experienced more coup d'états than any other country in contemporary history. Since 1932, Thailand has endured 11 successful military coups, as well as seven attempted coups. Max Fisher, "Thailand has had more coups than any other country. This is why," *The Washington Post*, December 3, 2013.

leadership will play a salient role in adjudicating between the conflicting claims, potentially breaking the impasse through “third way” solutions that are acceptable to both parties. To ensure its survival, it is in the interest of the rational political leadership to appease both the ethnic and military leaderships, and broker creative compromises where possible.

Based on the rational actor framework, the role played by the political leadership in amending military manpower policy depends largely on the status of the ethnic and military leaders in the country. Political leaders are likely to play the biggest role when there is a balance of power between the ethnic and military leaderships (i.e. when both ethnic and military leaders are driving forces, or when both are inactive). When either the ethnic or the military leadership is the dominant actor in the negotiating process, the political leadership is likely to yield to the demands to ensure its survival.

Summary of Theory

This section introduced a theory to explain how ethnic-military manpower policy is amended in multiethnic states. It argued that policy changes are the result of a two-stage process. In the first stage, ethnic and military leaders must independently decide whether to push for change. Only when each actor has high capabilities and high legitimacy will it serve as a driving force in amending military manpower policy. If any of the two conditions is absent, the actor will be inactive.

The second stage of the theory examines the negotiating process between the ethnic, military and political leaders. Using the results of the first stage, the theory examines how the interactions of the stylized positions of these sets of actors may combine to speed or block shifts in the military utilization of ethnic soldiers. In each

negotiating scenario, the nature of the change in ethnic-military manpower policy, the role played by the political leadership, and the outcomes of the changes are depicted. Both stages of the theory collectively explain how and why military manpower policy is amended in multiethnic states.

Research Methodology

In order to test the model, the “most likely” research design is used, where a scholar examines in depth several case studies in which a hypothesized relationship is believed most likely to be found. If the hypothesized relationship is present, the hypothesis is pronounced “plausible,” and if it is not found, the hypothesis is deemed “falsified.”³⁶

Similar to other qualitative methods in political science, the “most likely” approach has valuable properties: it investigates and scrutinizes the logic of the theoretical explanation, explains the mechanisms and linkages in the model, and helps account for variables that are difficult to measure. It also captures the elements of strategic interaction between the various actors, which cannot be neatly measured using quantitative or large-*N* methods.³⁷ The heightened attention to case-specific factors, however, comes at a cost: because the sample is a small one, the findings cannot be generalized to some larger set of unexamined cases. However, a systematic study of

³⁶ See Harry Eckstein, “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science,” in *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 7:79-138, for more information about the “most likely” research design.

³⁷ John Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 48.

“most likely” cases can probe and refine the plausibility of existing hypotheses, and generate new ones for future, out-of-sample tests.

Case Studies

Four case studies will be used to test the validity of the model, with one case study used for each of the four possible scenarios. The multiethnic states of South Africa, the US, the former Soviet Union, and Israel are selected because they serve as a good sample for a larger universe of cases. Each country offers variation in both the “capability” and “legitimacy” variables for ethnic and military leaders, thus providing a productive basis for comparison. To make the case studies more specific, time boundaries are imposed to define the scope of the data collection.³⁸

Table 4. Capability status of Military and Ethnic Leaders

	Military Leaders	Ethnic Leaders
South Africa (1970-1980)	High	Low
Israel (1970-1980)	High	High
Soviet Union (1945-1955)	Low	Low
USA (1945-1955)	Low	High

Source: Created by author.

NOTE: The next chapter will explain how the Capability status for each scenario is derived.

³⁸ Robert Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2014), 33-34.

Table 5. Legitimacy status of Military and Ethnic Leaders

	Military Leaders	Ethnic Leaders
South Africa (1970-1980)	Varies depending on time period	Varies depending on time period
Israel (1970-1980)		
Soviet Union (1945-1955)		
USA (1945-1955)		

Source: Created by author.

NOTE: The next chapter will explain how the Legitimacy status for each scenario is derived.

Limitations and Delimitations

Given the sensitivity of this issue, most countries in the world are opaque about the treatment of ethnic soldiers in their militaries, and there is limited public material available. Nonetheless, it is still possible to draw information from primary sources such as newspaper articles, speeches and interviews of politicians, diary entries, and memoranda from private meetings. Secondary sources such as journal articles and books are also consulted to provide additional information on the decision-making processes of the various actors. When such evidence is not available, as is often the case, proxy factors are used to indicate the thought processes of the various actors during the evolution of ethnic-military manpower policy.

A large-*N* statistical study was considered to complement the case studies that are examined in this thesis. However, the difficulty of obtaining a large universe of reliable data renders a large-*N* analysis unfeasible. Rather than spreading the research too thinly over a large number of cases, the focus here is on studying a few cases in greater detail so as to capture the elements of strategic interaction between the various actors.

Relationship between Theory and Case Studies

Theories require the simplification of actual events into abstract concepts, and the theoretical framework proposed in the thesis—like all models imposing order on an untidy world—represents a stylized version of more complicated real-world events. It aims to identify “causal chains . . . that reappear in a wide variety of settings but in different sequences and combinations, hence with different collective outcomes.”³⁹ As with all models, exceptions to the theory will inevitably arise, but the test of whether the theoretical framework proposed is meaningful is not whether it explains every minor alteration in military manpower policy, but whether it provides a useful lens through which to understand why such policies are amended in different ways. This qualitative study aims for transferability rather than generalization. Through detailed descriptions and analysis, the goal is to permit the reader to judge whether the results of the study would transfer to their particular situation.⁴⁰

The case studies that are examined in this thesis should exceed the theory’s grasp and should raise questions that the theory did not anticipate. The chapters that follow will not only assess the value of the proposed theory, but also examine if there are added complexities that deviate from the stylized portrayal of ethnic, military and political leaders.

³⁹ Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 23.

⁴⁰ See John Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2009), 192-193, on how “particularity” rather than “generalizability” is the hallmark of qualitative research.

CHAPTER 3

TESTING THE THEORY: THE CONDITIONS LEADING TO CHANGE

In this chapter, we test if the predictions made in Stage 1 of the theory hold true under empirical scrutiny. The first stage of the theory describes the conditions under which military and ethnic leaders will decide to press for change in military manpower policy. It posits that each actor will be a driving force for change only when they have high capability within their polity, and there is high legitimacy in advocating for change.

Conditions for Military Leaders to Press for Change

The hypothesis that military leaders must possess high capabilities and perceive high legitimacy before serving as driving forces for the integration of ethnic soldiers can be tested using US and South African case studies.

Table 6. Testing when Military Leaders will Press for Change

		Capability of Military Leaders	
		Low	High
Legitimacy in Advocating for Integration	Low	1. United States (pre-World War II) No demand for integration from military leadership <i>(Inactive)</i>	3. South Africa (1940s to early 1960s) Military leaders do not push for integration because integration is not in accordance with organizational interests <i>(Inactive)</i>
	High	2. United States (post-World War II) Military leaders will want to push for integration, but they do not have the ability or the clout to do so <i>(Inactive)</i>	4. South Africa (mid-1960s to 1970s) Military leaders are a driving force in pushing for integration <i>(Driving force)</i>

Source: Created by author.

The military leaderships of the US and South Africa provide a productive basis for comparison because the legitimacy variable changes within each case study over an extended time period. In the case of the US, military leaders' perceived legitimacy in advocating for integration changed from a low in the pre-World War II days to a high after World War II. In South Africa, the legitimacy increased from a low in the 1940s-1950s to a high in the 1970s.⁴¹ Therefore, we are able to test if the outcomes predicted in the hypothesis hold true under different permutations of the legitimacy variable.

The two cases are also selected because the capability status of the military leaderships differs greatly between the two—in South Africa, the military leadership is highly autonomous, while in the US, the military leadership is non-autonomous and subject to civilian control. The following section explains how the capability status of the South African and US military leaderships are classified.

Classifying the Capability Status of South African and US Military Leaders

Because there is no pre-established dataset that measures the autonomy level of different militaries, the research uses the qualitative analysis of scholars to classify the level of autonomy of military leaders. As specified in chapter 2, two independent indicators are used to determine if a military leadership has high capability (i.e. highly autonomous):⁴²

⁴¹ The details of these fluctuations in legitimacy will be provided later.

⁴² These two indicators were used by Samuel Huntington to assess the level of autonomy possessed by the US military. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 401-408.

1. The military leadership has the authority to handle and set its own organizational policies, doctrinal practices, and administrative affairs.
2. The military leadership has the authority to select and promote its own senior military officers.

In the case of South Africa, many scholars have observed the high level of autonomy enjoyed by the leadership of the South African Defense Force (SADF) to make its own policies. Peled presents compelling evidence to show how South African military leaders “make the final decision” on their administration, organizational, and doctrinal policies. Even though the “officers and the politicians do not see eye to eye on many issues,” Peled argues, the policies championed by military officers frequently prevailed. This leads him to conclude that “a professionally autonomous group of senior officers” existed in the SADF that steered the organizational policies of the military.⁴³

Grundy echoes Peled’s observations by describing the SADF’s military leadership as one that is “independent” of the state, and one of the few examples of military leadership that “dared to challenge or tried to modernize precarious or unstable regimes.” According to Grundy, the “officers [in the SADF] are not state actors,” as the promotion of senior military officers was internally determined by the armed forces. This led Grundy to conclude that the SADF leadership “retained the central decision-making force” within the military, and was thus highly autonomous from the political leadership.⁴⁴

⁴³ Peled, *A Question of Loyalty*, 43-54.

⁴⁴ Kenneth Grundy, “Black Soldiers in a White Military,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 4, no. 3 (September 1981): 302-304.

In contrast to the South African case, the US military leadership has been regarded by many scholars as having low autonomy, and thus considered to have low capability in the context of this study. It is a well-established fact that a pattern of civilian control exists that curtails the autonomy of the US military leadership. For example, the President of the United States is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Additionally, Congress possesses substantial powers in checking and approving the policies of the US military. For example, Huntington shows that “in the ten years following World War II, Congress was almost constantly occupied with major substantive issues of military policy.”⁴⁵ The House and Senate Armed Services Committees were preeminent, and virtually all bills concerning the military establishment had to be considered by them. Congress continues to possess the power to “review in exhaustive detail military procedure and administration,” and plays a major role in the appropriation of defense expenditure and the selection of senior military officers.⁴⁶ Hence, it is clear that strong civilian control exists in the US military establishment, and US military leaders are largely non-autonomous on the substantive issues of military policy.

Having established the contrasting capability status of South African and US military leaderships, we proceed to examine the conditions under which military leaders will push for changes in ethnic-military manpower policy. An important caveat before we begin. This hypothesis seeks to investigate whether military leaders will advocate for changes in ethnic-military manpower policy under different capability and legitimacy

⁴⁵ Huntington, 401.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 407.

conditions. It makes no judgment about whether such advocacy will ultimately succeed—i.e. produce outcomes that are in accordance with the military leaders’ preferences. The outcomes of the advocacy are dependent on the complex interaction between military, ethnic, and political leaders, and this will be the subject of the next chapter.

Quadrant 1, US (Pre-World War II):
Low Capability and Low Legitimacy

Prior to World War II, the empirical evidence suggests that US military leaders had low legitimacy in advocating for the integration of blacks into the US military, due largely to the disappointing military performance of black soldiers during the First World War. At the outbreak of the First World War, blacks made up about 10.7 percent of the general American population, and the Selective Service draft ensured that around the same proportion served in the military.⁴⁷ Many blacks pinned their hopes for a better future on involvement in the war and black leaders hoped to use the armed forces as a vehicle for social change. W.E.B. Dubois, for example, argued in 1917 that “if the black man could fight to defeat the Kaiser . . . he could later present a bill for payment due to a grateful white America.”⁴⁸ However, the bulk of black draftees were assigned to menial occupations in logistics battalions, and the few black soldiers who were in combat units received little or no combat training prior to their deployment to the battlefield.

⁴⁷ Martin Binkin and Mark Eitelberg, *Blacks and the Military* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982), 17.

⁴⁸ Stephen Ambrose, “Blacks in the Army in Two World Wars,” in *The Military in American Society*, eds. Stephen Ambrose and James Barber (New York: Free Press, 1971), 178-179.

In the aftermath of World War I, many commanders in the US military felt that blacks did not contribute to the success of the war effort. Based on reports submitted by white officers, black troops were alleged to have demonstrated poor performance in combat, and were accused of being cowardly and weak fighters.⁴⁹ Black combat soldiers were mostly assigned to the 92nd and 93rd Divisions, both of which received a “low opinion” from senior military leadership in the aftermath of the war.⁵⁰ General Robert Bullard, the commander of the US 1st Infantry Division, wrote in a memo to his superiors that black combat troops were “hopelessly inferior,” that he “could not make them fight,” and that “they wasted time and dawdled when they did attack.”⁵¹ Although some army officers believed that the black soldier, when properly trained and led, was the equal of the white soldier, the top military leadership did not accept this view. In 1924, a classified report produced by the Army Chief of Staff stated as “fact” the inferiority of the black soldier and the poor leadership qualities of black officers, and argued for the limited use of blacks in future military mobilizations.⁵²

The disappointing military performance of black soldiers meant that there was very little legitimacy for the military leadership to integrate them into the armed forces after the First World War, as they had demonstrated little military value. Coupled with

⁴⁹ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, *Black Americans in Defense of Our Nation* (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 1985), 32.

⁵⁰ Bernard Nalty and Morris MacGregor, eds., *Blacks in the Military: Essential Documents* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1981), 89.

⁵¹ Jack Foner, *Blacks and the Military in American History* (New York: Praeger, 1974), 128.

⁵² Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, 32.

the non-autonomous character of the US military leadership, there should be minimal demand from military leaders to amend the existing policy of discrimination in the military. Did this happen in reality?

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the general sentiment among top military leaders was that black combat troops should continue to be used only in segregated units, and that other black soldiers should be confined to labor and service duties—no different from the conditions that black soldiers faced prior to the First World War. Military leaders in the Marines kept unchanged their policy of completely excluding blacks from the Corps, and the Marine Commandant's declaration that blacks were "trying to break into a club that doesn't want them" left little doubt concerning the official attitude of the Marine Corps towards black servicemen.⁵³ In 1937, the US Army announced that the strength of blacks in the Army would continue to be limited to their proportion of the general populace in the US, which was around 10 percent.⁵⁴ This was the same percentage as the strength of the black soldiers in the military during the First World War. Black seamen in the US Navy were permitted to remain but continued serving in labor and housekeeping positions.⁵⁵ The perception in the minds of top military leaders was that black soldiers were of limited military value, and this meant that there was very little justification from a functionalist perspective to fully integrate black soldiers into the

⁵³ Records were reviewed by the author from the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, VA, during a research trip on April 18, 2015.

⁵⁴ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, 33.

⁵⁵ Foner, 129.

armed forces. Military leaders were thus inactive and did not press for ethnic reform from the end of the First World War through to the mid-1940s.

Quadrant 2, US (Post-World War II):
Low Capability and High Legitimacy

World War II has often been seen as a major turning point in the history of ethnic integration in the US military, and one of the reasons was that it largely debunked the perception amongst US military leaders that black soldiers were of limited military value. Large numbers of combat troops were needed by US military commanders to assist in the Allied war effort, and black soldiers were used to occupy vacant positions that white soldiers could not fill. For example, in 1942, the US Navy decided to accept black volunteers for general service in all branches, and almost 150,000 blacks served in the Navy during World War II. In late 1944, as a result of Germany's offensive in the Ardennes, US army commanders assigned some 2500 black soldiers to white companies in the First and Seventh Armies to boost troop numbers, marking the first time that white and black soldiers had fought together in integrated units in the US army.⁵⁶ The exigencies of the war meant that the Marine Corps could no longer meet its requirements through a relatively small, all-white volunteer force. New Marines arrived in the form of reservists and draftees in numbers never before imagined, and for the first time, black Marines were allowed to serve in significant numbers.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, 35.

⁵⁷ Records were reviewed by the author from the National Museum of the Marine Corps in Triangle, VA, during a research trip on April 18, 2015.

World War II showed US military commanders that black soldiers were important to the country's defense as they could be used to boost troop numbers if the US were to be deeply involved in a major external war. Black soldiers demonstrated their importance through their anticipated military value (their utility in the event of a future military conflict akin to World War II), and this meant that there was increased legitimacy for US military leaders to advocate for the integration of blacks into the armed forces.

The excellent combat performance of black soldiers during World War II (proven military utility) was a further reason why the legitimacy of ethnic integration increased in the aftermath of the war. For example, the 92nd Division, an all-black division that fought in Europe, performed superbly in combat operations, as seen from its overall record in World War II. Over 12,000 decorations and citations were awarded to individuals in the 92nd. This included two Distinguished Service Crosses, 16 Legion of Merit Awards, 95 Silver Stars, and nearly 1,100 Purple Hearts.⁵⁸ Several small, non-divisional units were also created and staffed by black soldiers. One of the most well-known was the 761st Tank Battalion which was engaged in combat in Europe—it fought continuously for 183 days and conducted over 30 major assaults, eventually winning the Presidential Unit Citation for its excellent combat performance.⁵⁹ The 332nd Fighter Group, one of the two black air units that saw combat during the war, was hailed by military leaders for destroying a German Navy destroyer by fighter aircraft—a feat that had never before been accomplished—and was also the only bomber escort group never to

⁵⁸ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, 34.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

have lost a bomber to enemy fighters during combat.⁶⁰ Hence, black soldiers demonstrated their combat worth during World War II, proving their military value not only in terms of their contribution to troop numbers, but also in terms of their excellent combat performance.

The military utility of black soldiers—both proven and anticipated—was not lost on US military commanders in the aftermath of the war, and this was demonstrated by their attempts to advocate for the increasing integration of black soldiers in the postwar period. Senior Navy commanders, led by Admiral T. L. Sprague, began lobbying for the impartial treatment of black seamen in an integrated service, albeit with certain restrictions.⁶¹ Colonel E. F. Olsen, in a memorandum written for the Army Chief of Staff, urged the Secretary of War to consider “the desirability and necessity of employing more effectively the large reservoir of manpower available in the Negro population of the United States.”⁶² Additionally, General George Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, personally lobbied his civilian counterparts in the War Department for changes in military manpower policy, arguing that the record of black soldiers on the battlefield should be considered by the War Department in planning for the army’s postwar

⁶⁰ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, 37.

⁶¹ Bureau of Naval Personnel Circular Letter No. 48-46, “Negro Naval Personnel,” February 27, 1946, Technical Library, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC.

⁶² Memorandum, Colonel E. F. Olsen, Ground Adjutant General, for US Army Chief of Staff, 28 November 1945, Subject: “Participation of Negro troops in the postwar military establishment,” Modern Military Branch, National Archives, Washington, DC.

manpower needs, and urging the Department to consider “the practicability of integrating Negro elements into white units.”⁶³

The efforts by top military leaders to press for changes in ethnic participation culminated in the Gillem Report of 1946, which was prepared by a board of senior officers under the direction of General Alvan Gillem and submitted to the Truman administration. The report recognized the functional necessity of integrating blacks into the armed forces, and called for the military to adopt a policy that provided for the flexible use of black manpower, recommending the establishment of “composite units” that included both blacks and whites. However, the Truman administration rejected 17 out of the 18 recommendations of the Gillem Report, making clear that the military’s policies were subject to civilian review.⁶⁴

The important lesson to take away from this case study is that even if military leaders have high legitimacy in advocating for integration, their desires do not allow them to become a driving force for change if they do not have the capabilities to back them up. In the aftermath of World War II, US military leaders wanted increased ethnic integration, but they had neither the ability nor the clout to actualize their demands.

⁶³ Memorandum, US Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall, for Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, August 25, 1945, Modern Military Records Branch, National Archives, Washington, DC.

⁶⁴ One possible reason why Truman rejected the recommendations of the Gillem Report in 1946 was that he did not want to expend precious political capital to fight for the integration of blacks in the military when it was still not politically expedient to do so, especially when it was still two years before the 1948 presidential elections. As President, his support for civil rights only became apparent starting from 1947, when race became an important issue in the run-up to the 1948 presidential elections. Records were reviewed by the author from the Harry Truman Presidential Library and Museum in Independence, MO, during a research trip on April 4, 2015.

We now turn to the case of the highly autonomous South African military leadership to contrast its experience in advocating for changes in ethnic-military manpower policy.

Quadrant 3, South Africa (1940s to early 60s):
High Capability and Low Legitimacy

When the South African National Party (NP) swept to power in 1948, it disbanded the last black units in the South African Defense Force (SADF), proclaiming that “Africans should not be in a position, by virtue of military training and the possession of modern arms, to challenge effectively the asymmetrical balance of power between the Africans and whites.”⁶⁵ The military leadership of the SADF, though highly autonomous from the civilian leadership, did not challenge the decision of the government. Why was that so?

A large body of evidence suggests that in the period from the mid-1940s to the early 1960s, military leaders in the SADF did not perceive black soldiers to be of significant military value. Their judgment was predominantly influenced by the experience of black soldiers in the SADF during World War II. Most black soldiers had served in service and support positions during the war, although a small number of them had been tasked to help in combat in the Middle East when the military could not muster enough white soldiers for the job.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Dale, “The Legacy of the Imperial-Commonwealth Connection,” 79.

⁶⁶ Kenneth Grundy, *Soldiers Without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 74-89.

Black units were known to suffer from notorious morale problems, affecting their ability to perform their service and support roles during the war. Insubordination, vandalism, passive resistance, and desertion were huge problems confronting black units during the war, and many white military commanders did not know how to handle their disgruntled and poorly motivated black soldiers.⁶⁷ In August 1943, a mutiny involving fifty black soldiers occurred in a military garrison in Garawi, which was only put down after military commanders shot dead three mutinous soldiers and seriously wounded nine others.⁶⁸ In another case that occurred in the same year, three hundred black soldiers from the 6th Armored Division who were being shipped by train back to their military base rioted on the train and attempted to alight before the train arrived at the base. White soldiers had to be called in and only regained control after firing gunshots at the crowd of unruly black soldiers.⁶⁹

Although the SADF managed to rein in such cases of military misconduct, their occurrence contributed to the negative appraisal of black soldiers among military commanders in the SADF.⁷⁰ Black soldiers were perceived as having limited military value as their presence caused numerous problems that affected the ability of the SADF to function at its optimal strength. There was thus low legitimacy for SADF leaders to advocate for the integration of blacks into the military, even though they had the capability to do so. For example, Field Marshal Jan Smuts warned in the aftermath of

⁶⁷ Grundy, 81.

⁶⁸ Ian Gleeson, *The Unknown Force* (Cape Town: Ashanti Publishing, 1994), 168.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 166-167.

⁷⁰ Grundy, 19.

World War II that integrating black soldiers in the SADF would lead to further problems for the military leadership, including mutinous behavior and rampant military misconduct akin to the Garawi incident of 1943.⁷¹

It did not help that in the few instances where black soldiers were tasked for combat during World War II, they suffered heavy casualties and failed in their missions, further lowering the legitimacy of SADF leaders to advocate for their integration. For example, when members of the all-black Cape Corps were tasked to assist the 1st South African Division in fighting the Germans in Egypt in 1942, they suffered a humiliating defeat and had to be withdrawn.⁷² Major General Francis Guingand, the Army Chief of Staff, noted that military commanders were conscious of the heavy casualties suffered by black combat units and were skeptical of the ability of blacks to be effective soldiers.⁷³ Thus, when the South African government decided in 1948 to disband black units in the SADF, military commanders did not challenge the decision and instead allowed the discrimination to persist.

Quadrant 4, South Africa (Mid 1960s to 70s):
High Capability and High Legitimacy

Three major factors in the 1960s and 1970s caused SADF leaders to reconsider the military utility of black soldiers, and to press for ethnic reform in order to fulfill the professional goals of the military organization. The first was the rapid change in the

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Gleeson, 178-179.

⁷³ Francis Guingand, *Operation Victory* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), 467-469.

demographic balance among whites and blacks in South Africa from 1960 onwards, due to the vastly different birthrates of the two populations. Figure 1 shows the precipitous increase in the black population from 1960-1975, contrasted with the marginal growth of whites in the same time period. SADF leaders feared that the increasing demand of skilled white workers in the labor force would lead to an ever-shrinking pool of young whites that were available for the military, straining the ability of the military to meet the future security needs of the country.⁷⁴




Figure 1. The population of South Africa by racial groups, 1960-1975

Source: South African Central Statistical Services, quoted in *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* (Johannesburg, Institute of Race Relations, 1993), 8.

⁷⁴ William Steenkamp, “The SA Defense Force: Rogue Elephant, Slave of Circumstance, or Cyclops in the Land of the Blind?” *Leadership SA* 2, no. 4 (Summer 1983): 54.

The problem of scarce white manpower resources was compounded by the increase in external threats that were facing South Africa in the early 1970s. Relations were increasingly tense between South Africa and South West Africa (present-day Namibia), and the arrival of Soviet and Cuban forces to Angola further compelled the SADF to prepare for the possibility of large-scale conventional war.⁷⁵ This meant that more soldiers were needed, and the discriminatory policy towards black soldiers made no sense in view of the limited white manpower resources available to the SADF. Thus, senior military commanders began to explore the idea of expanding the voluntary recruitment of black soldiers in lieu of whites in the SADF, as they had anticipated increased military utility of black soldiers in the face of mounting external threats to the country.⁷⁶

The incentives for SADF leaders to advocate for the integration of black soldiers were further enhanced when the all-black South Africa Cape Corps that was sent to fight in South West Africa in 1974 performed excellently. A Ministry of Defense report in 1975 concluded that black soldiers who had been sent to fight in South West Africa “acquitted themselves well” under combat conditions, and had a positive impact on the war effort.⁷⁷ From a military standpoint, black soldiers were vital to the SADF when it was fighting a large-scale conventional war with one of its black neighboring countries,

⁷⁵ Deon Fourie, “The Evolving Experience,” in *Defense Policy Formation: Towards Comparative Analysis*, ed., James Roherrty (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1980), 103-105.

⁷⁶ Steenkamp, 55.

⁷⁷ Peled, *A Question of Loyalty*, 62.

because only they possessed the cultural and linguistic assets required to win such wars.⁷⁸ Hence, the policy of discriminating against black servicemen meant that the SADF was being deprived of one of its most effective pool of manpower. These functional reasons convinced the senior military leadership that changes in ethnic-military manpower policy were necessary in order to fulfill the professional goals of the military.

The precipitous increase in the legitimacy caused SADF leaders to aggressively push for the integration of black soldiers. The Chief of Army, General Magnus Malan, who created the all-black South Africa Cape Corps in 1963, engaged in efforts to boost ethnic integration in the SADF in the late 1970s. This included forming black units such as the 21st Battalion, preparing black companies for operational duties, and sharply increasing the number of black cadets admitted into officer school. Senior commanders in the South African Navy also began to push for an end to the traditional segregation order and to allow whites and blacks to work shoulder to shoulder on combat ships.⁷⁹ The combination of the military leadership's high capability and its perception that there were strong legitimate grounds to integrate black soldiers allowed military leaders to create an internal ethnic revolution in the SADF.

Analysis

The case studies of the US and South African military leaderships corroborate the predictions made in the hypothesis to a large extent. Military leaders with low capabilities, such as those in the US, were shown to be inactive in pressing for integration

⁷⁸ Ibid., 42.

⁷⁹ Alon Peled, "Soldiers Apart: A Study of Ethnic-Military Manpower Policies in Singapore, Israel, and South Africa" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1993), 274.

under conditions of both low and high legitimacy. In the first scenario of low legitimacy, US military leaders did not even attempt to advocate for change, as they perceived no benefits if integration were to take place. When new circumstances forced the military leaders to reconsider the military value of black soldiers, we observed internal efforts by these leaders to increase the military utilization of black soldiers. Even though the leaders wanted change, they had neither the ability nor the clout to promote change. Seen from this perspective, “capability” is the permissive condition that allows military leaders to pursue the option of integration. In its absence, even military leaders with high legitimacy will fail to become a driving force for ethnic reforms in the armed forces.

In the case of the South African military leadership that had high capability, we observed no attempts by SADF leaders to push for integration when they perceived little military value in black soldiers. However, events in the mid- to late-1960s demonstrated both the proven and anticipated military utility of black soldiers. Under such conditions, the highly autonomous military leadership was an active driver in the integration of black soldiers into the SADF.

While the case studies largely support the hypothesis, they also raise certain questions that the theory did not anticipate. In the case of the US military leadership, it is important to note that black soldiers were used for combat purposes during the First World War, largely because the US military lacked manpower, and military leaders anticipated military value in using black soldiers to alleviate this manpower shortage. However, because of their poor military performance during the First World War, black soldiers were discarded in the aftermath of the war. This example shows that “anticipated military value”—as an independent factor by itself—is insufficient to persuade military

leaders that ethnic soldiers are worthy of long-term integration in the armed forces. Ethnic soldiers that have only anticipated military value can simply be used for the duration of the conflict when their “value” is required to alleviate manpower shortages, and then discharged after that when the external threats subside. It is only when marginalized ethnicities demonstrate both anticipated and proven military value (e.g. in the aftermath of World War II) that military leaders perceive legitimate grounds to advocate for their sustained integration.

The South African case study also refines the theory by revealing that military leaders can perceive low legitimacy based on factors other than a lack of proven or anticipated military utility. For the leaders of the SADF, black soldiers were viewed as being worthless to the armed forces in the aftermath of World War II, not only because of their poor combat performance, but also due to their track record of mutinous behavior and rampant military misconduct that disrupted the proper functioning of the SADF. Hence, it is important to note that the military value of ethnic soldiers is a function of not only their war-fighting capabilities (whether proven or anticipated) but also a function of other non-combat factors that can affect the efficacy of the armed forces. These non-combat factors, such as the potential for military misconduct or mutinous behavior, can also be taken into account in the legitimacy calculus for military leaders.

Finally, the South African case study reveals a theoretical possibility that had not been initially considered. Even if military leaders find it useful for ethnic soldiers to participate in the armed forces in order to maximize military strength, why must they necessarily integrate these ethnic soldiers into the armed forces? Why can't military leaders—borrowing from the example of the all-black South African Cape Corps (SACC)—

use these ethnic soldiers in separate, segregated units, hence harnessing their combat capabilities while avoiding the politically unpopular policy of integration into mixed units? The all-black, fully-segregated SACC demonstrates how this theoretical possibility was manifested in reality, but its short-lived existence shows that segregated units are only a temporary solution that may not be tenable in the long run.

There are two reasons why segregated units may be untenable in the long-term. First, it is much more costly for the armed forces if an entirely separate infrastructure needs to be created to cater exclusively to segregated units. For example, during peacetime, schools and training facilities will need to be created that are used exclusively by black soldiers, that lead to the unnecessary duplication of facilities and wastage of scarce resources. During wartime, segregation limits the options available to military leaders in planning joint operations involving soldiers from different military units, thus restricting the tactical flexibility of military leaders and undermining the efficacy of war planning. Therefore, while segregation is a short-term possibility, in the long run it proves to be an inefficient and costly solution for the military. It is therefore unlikely that military leaders will want to pursue this option if their goal is to maximize the strength of the armed forces.

Second, segregation is also a more risky option for military leaders as it increases the chances of renegade ethnic units running amok and creating trouble for the military. Integrating ethnic soldiers with other soldiers is a way of flattening out the risks by ensuring that soldiers within composite units can keep check on one another. Therefore, integration is a way for military leaders to harness the capabilities of ethnic soldiers

without the dangers of concentrating these soldiers in one or two potentially renegade ethnic units.

In sum, the theoretical arguments presented in the first hypothesis are largely robust under empirical examination, but the theory can be refined if we take into account the various deviations that are highlighted above. We now turn to the second hypothesis to examine the conditions under which ethnic leaders will agitate for changes in military manpower policy.

Conditions for Ethnic Leaders to Press for Change

The hypothesis that ethnic leaders must possess high capabilities and perceive high legitimacy before serving as driving forces for the integration of ethnic soldiers can be tested using the case studies of Oriental Jews and Druze in Israel.

Table 7. Testing when Ethnic Leaders will Press for Change

		Capability of Ethnic Leaders	
		Low	High
Legitimacy in Advocating for Integration	Low	1. Oriental Jews (1950s to late 1960s) No demand for integration from ethnic leadership <i>(Inactive)</i>	3. Israeli Druze (1950s to mid-1960s) Ethnic leaders do not press for integration because such demands are perceived as illegitimate and thus costly for ethnic leaders <i>(Inactive)</i>
	High	2. Oriental Jews (1970s) Ethnic leaders will want to press for integration, but they lack the ability or the clout to do so <i>(Inactive)</i>	4. Israeli Druze (Late 1960s to 1970s) Ethnic leaders are a driving force in pressing for integration <i>(Driving force)</i>

Source: Created by author.

The Oriental Jews and Druze are two ethnic groups within Israel that are used as comparative case studies. These two groups have different degrees of political power, or capability: the Oriental Jews have weak leaders, while the Druze (Arab Israelis) have strong and influential leadership.⁸⁰ The two ethnic groups are selected from within the same country as a basis for comparison in order to minimize the confounding variables that may exist if ethnic groups from different countries were chosen.

These two ethnic groups are also selected because the legitimacy variable alters within each case study over an extended time period. Both the Oriental and the Druze leaderships perceived low legitimacy in advocating for integration in the 1950s and 1960s, but circumstances caused this perception to change in the mid- to late 1960s.⁸¹ Therefore, we are able to test if the outcomes predicted in the hypothesis hold true under different permutations of the legitimacy and capability variables for ethnic leaders.

Quadrant 1, Oriental Jews (1950s to late 60s):
Low Capability and Low Legitimacy

During the early 1950s, a large influx of immigrant Oriental Jews entered Israel to escape persecution in Arab lands. Most of them lacked basic education and did not speak Hebrew, lending to stereotypes of Orientals as being inferior and even primitive. The Oriental community suffered from weak and divided leadership, and the few Oriental ethnic leaders who claimed to represent the interests of the community had little, if any, political power. Gutmann suggests that since most of the Oriental leaders were not

⁸⁰ More details will be provided subsequently to explain how the capability status of the Oriental and Druze leaders are derived.

⁸¹ Details will be provided later in the chapter.

native-born, the Oriental community had very few leaders who were familiar with the intricacies of the Israeli political system: “most of the Oriental leaders found the gap between them and the prevailing system, which was quite alien to them, too wide to bridge.”⁸² Oriental leaders were therefore amateurs in Israeli politics and found themselves being taken advantage of by the more experienced players. For example, leaders from the Oriental Sfaradi party, which won four Knesset (Parliament) seats in Israel’s first elections, were co-opted early on into the dominant Labor party and submitted themselves to propagating the official arguments of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. Since the political careers of Oriental leaders such as Behor Shitrit were totally dependent on party bosses in Labor rather than on the Oriental constituents of the party, there was hardly any advocacy on behalf of the Oriental community.⁸³

To make matters worse, most of the Oriental immigrants in the 1950s had not yet reached voting age, thus the Oriental community was handicapped in its ability to use the threat of the ballot box to affect the policies of the government. The weak ethnic leadership was reflected in the low number of seats that Orientals won in the Second Knesset in 1951. Only seven Orientals were elected to the Second Knesset, representing a population of over 500,000 Oriental Jews. In contrast, eight Arabs were elected to the Second Knesset even though they represented a small population of only 150,000 Israeli

⁸² Emanuel Gutmann, “Parliamentary Elites: Israel,” in *Electoral Politics in the Middle East*, ed., Jacob Landau, Ergun Ozbudun, and Frank Tachau (Stanford: Hoover Press Publication, 1980), 287.

⁸³ Jack Katzenell, “Minorities in the IDF,” *IDF Journal* 4, no. 3 (Fall 1987): 40-45.

Arabs.⁸⁴ Oriental leaders thus possessed very limited political influence and the Oriental community had very little voice in the political process.

Oriental soldiers were mostly assigned to low-prestige military vocations and performed menial jobs throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and ethnic leaders could not push for improvements not only because they lacked the capability to do so, but also because there was very little legitimacy in advocating for change. A relatively large number of Oriental draftees did not have command of the Hebrew language—the language of communication in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)—and this significantly limited their military value to the IDF. The following graph compares Hebrew language knowledge among the three principal ethnic groups of IDF conscripts (Oriental, Ashkenazi and Israeli-born) in 1953.




Figure 2. 1953 IDF Conscripts: Percentage of ethnic group that cannot speak Hebrew

Source: IDF Archives, File 55/65/4, quoted in Alon Peled, “Soldiers Apart: A Study of Ethnic-Military Manpower Policies in Singapore, Israel, and South Africa” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1993), 300.

⁸⁴ Gutmann, 289.

As such, most of the military units with Oriental soldiers did very little military training, because the new conscripts devoted most of their time to Hebrew classes. Military commanders frequently complained to headquarters that their battalions had turned from operational units into schools. To compound the problem of Hebrew illiteracy, Oriental soldiers were also the least educated amongst the various ethnic groups in the 1950s. For example, nearly four out of every five conscripts who had never attended school were Orientals. Throughout the 1950s, Oriental conscripts were consistently at the bottom of the scale when it came to military aptitude tests and psychometric assessments.⁸⁵

Thus, when Oriental soldiers found themselves trapped at the bottom tier of the IDF hierarchical ladder, there was very little that ethnic leaders could do. Units in which soldiers could not communicate with their commanders could not possibly perform well on the battlefield, and the low military value of the Oriental soldiers meant that there was very little legitimate grounds to amend ethnic-military manpower policy. Not only were the Oriental leaders politically weak, they had little justification for why Oriental soldiers deserved to be treated better in the military. Behor Shitrit, the most renowned Oriental Jewish leader, admitted in 1953 that Orientals could not expect proportionate representation in the upper echelons of the military, given their dismal military performance.⁸⁶ Ethnic leaders were both unable and unwilling to incur the very high costs of advocating for the integration of their kinsmen into the military, given the low military

⁸⁵ Katzenell, 44.

⁸⁶ Yitzhak Moshe Emanuel, *The Gap: Absorption, Attitudes and Propositions to Resolve the Melting Pot Issue in Israel* (Hulon: Ami Publications, 1968), 170.

value of Oriental soldiers. Therefore, Oriental leaders resorted to demanding that their kinsmen eliminate all thoughts that there ever had been any pre-planned state-sanctioned discrimination campaign against them.⁸⁷ The lack of capability on the part of ethnic leaders, coupled with the lack of legitimacy for integration, meant that there was no demand for change in military manpower policy from the leaders of the Oriental community.

Quadrant 2, Oriental Jews (1970s):
Low Capability and High Legitimacy

Two factors in the 1970s led to an increase in the legitimacy of integrating Oriental soldiers into the IDF. First, efforts by the Israeli government in the late 1950s and 1960s to improve the literacy and educational standards of Oriental youths were beginning to bear fruit, enabling Oriental soldiers to become useful members of the IDF. For example, the percentage of Oriental Jews who could speak fluent Hebrew jumped from 21 percent in the early 1950s to 65 percent in 1976.⁸⁸ The improvements in literacy and education standards also led to increases in military aptitude and psychometric test scores for Oriental soldiers, as many of them began to understand the questions in the tests that were written in Hebrew. A study in 1976 revealed that 78 percent of Oriental youths felt that schooling in Israel had enabled them to be comfortable with Hebrew language and literature, Jewish history, the Bible, aspects of the Talmud, and other

⁸⁷ Emanuel, 170.

⁸⁸ Sammy Smooha, *The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel* (Haifa: The Institute of Middle Eastern Studies of the University of Haifa, 1984), 72.

Jewish traditions.⁸⁹ It can be argued that this boosted the military value of Oriental soldiers as they became increasingly assimilated into the culture and language of the IDF.

The second factor that led to an increase in the legitimacy of integrating minority groups into the IDF was the high levels of external threats confronting Israel in the 1970s and the resulting shortage of manpower in the IDF. After being attacked twice by Arab states from 1967 to 1973, IDF commanders recognized that the IDF had to triple in size in order to confront the external threats facing the country.⁹⁰ Given that the population of the Orientals had increased by more than half, to constitute 23 percent of the Jewish population in 1973, there was increased legitimacy for integrating this population into the military in order to boost the numbers of the IDF.

This increase in the legitimacy for integration made it more compelling for Oriental leaders to push for changes as it drove down the costs of advocacy. However, there was still very little that Oriental leaders could do to press for ethnic reform, as they were politically weak. Although Oriental Jews represented almost a quarter of the Jewish population in 1973, they only filled 11 percent of the seats in the Knesset. Not a single member of the Israeli cabinet was an Oriental, and Gutmann pointed out that Oriental leaders “could not penetrate the upper echelons of politics” and were the most politically emasculated group in the Knesset.⁹¹

In spite of the increase in legitimacy in advocating for change, the limited political influence of ethnic leaders meant that their demands were largely ignored by the

⁸⁹ Smooha, 71.

⁹⁰ Gutmann, 290.

⁹¹ Ibid., 287-289.

political leadership. For example, when Oriental leaders demanded more equality in the military and publicly pressed the Israeli government to advance more Oriental soldiers to officership, there was no response from the government.⁹² A young Oriental leader summed up the growing frustration of the Oriental leadership that found itself incapable of fighting for the rights of their kinsmen in the military: “I do not see why a Rumanian speaker or a Polish speaker [European Jews] is better than an Oriental. As long as the two of them do not understand the spiritual and cultural climate in Israel, no one should claim extra privileges because of his skin color.”⁹³ Horizontal and vertical integration of Oriental soldiers proceeded at a snail’s pace in the 1970s, and there was very little that Oriental leaders could do to change the situation.

Quadrant 3, The Druze (1950s to Mid-60s):
High Capability and Low Legitimacy

The Druze are an Arab ethnic group that live in three Middle Eastern countries: Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. In Israel, they make up less than 10 percent of the population.⁹⁴ Although they are a small community, they are politically powerful. Scholars attribute their disproportionate political influence to their very high rate of voter participation in elections (the highest for any minority group) and their widely-recognized solidarity in voting as a bloc.⁹⁵ Gabriel Ben-Dor observes that as early as the

⁹² Shlomeo Cohen-Tzidon, *The Problem of Oriental Communities Representation in the Knesset and in the State’s Institutions* (Jerusalem: Sfaradi Party, 1975), 32-33.

⁹³ Ibid., 31.

⁹⁴ Jacob Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), 32.

⁹⁵ Ori Stendel, *The Arabs in Israel* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1996), 150.

1950s, Druze leaders had been known to cultivate strong friendships with important political leaders, which was a “visible sign of strength” of their ethnic leadership.⁹⁶ Prominent Druze leaders were able to penetrate the higher echelons of public institutions, and held senior positions in government ministries, the judiciary, and the press. Although Druze leaders were the representatives of only a small constituency in Israel, they have wielded disproportionate political influence since the birth of Israel.

Druze soldiers participated in the 1948 War of Independence in military units that were segregated from the Jewish units. During the war, IDF commanders were skeptical of the loyalty of the Druze ethnic group, particularly since there were large Druze communities in both neighboring Syria and Lebanon, giving rise to fears that the Druze in Israel might be “Trojan horses” who pretended to be fighting for Israel even though their real loyalties were elsewhere. The wartime performance of Druze servicemen only served to exacerbate this distrust—for instance, the IDF registered numerous cases of defections by Druze servicemen to the ranks of the Arab enemies.⁹⁷ In a startling incident on October 28, 1948, the people of Jat and Yanuh, two Druze villages in Israel occupied by a Syrian Druze battalion, betrayed their oral promise to cooperate with the Jews, and slaughtered a Jewish IDF unit that was approaching their villages.⁹⁸

Even though Druze soldiers continued to serve in the Minority Unit of the IDF after the war, high-ranking commanders openly questioned the allegiance of these

⁹⁶ Gabriel Ben-Dor, *The Druzes in Israel: A Political Study* (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1979), 156.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁹⁸ David Coren, *Steadfast Alliance: The Druze Community in Palestine and the “Hagana”* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1991), 70-74.

soldiers. This was exacerbated by battlefield failures of the Minority Unit. In a high-profile incident in May 1951, a large force of Druze soldiers from the Minority Unit failed to repel a small Syrian force that dug itself into a hill inside Israeli territory. In another widely publicized incident in January 1953, 12 riflemen from the Jordanian National Guard held down an entire Minority Unit battalion, causing them to finally abort their mission and withdraw.⁹⁹ Mordechai Makleff, the IDF Chief of Staff in the early 1950s, publicly complained about the abysmal motivation and combat skills of the Arab (Druze and Circassian) soldiers within the IDF.¹⁰⁰

The lack of professionalism of the Druze soldiers, coupled with the prominently publicized cases of Druze disloyalty during the 1948 war, made it very difficult for ethnic leaders to push for changes in military manpower policy. The questionable military value of Druze soldiers meant that Druze leaders would have to incur very high costs in persuading a skeptical audience of military and political leaders of the importance of integration, with uncertain chances of success. Druze leaders admitted that there were “high inertia and psychological barriers” towards advocating for integration, and acknowledged that integration was a process that must “grow naturally.”¹⁰¹ Salaman Tariff, a prominent Druze sheikh, described integration as a “delicate political matter” that can only be pursued when Druze soldiers have proved their worth and their loyalty in

⁹⁹ Schiff, 72-73.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 53.

¹⁰¹ Amnon Yanai, “The Recruitment of Druze to the IDF,” October 15, 1953, Israeli State Archives, file 130, 2402/28, quoted in Kais Firro, *The Druzes in the Jewish State* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 118.

the IDF.¹⁰² Hence, even though Druze leaders were politically influential, they were very hesitant about pressing for the integration of Druze soldiers into the IDF in the 1950s and 1960s. Many of these leaders privately acknowledged that Druze soldiers had performed poorly in combat and had not demonstrated why they deserved to be treated as equals with the Jews in the IDF. These ethnic leaders were therefore reluctant to expend political capital to fight an uphill battle for the rights of their kinsmen to be integrated into the IDF.

Quadrant 4, The Druze (Late-1960s to 70s):
High Capability and High Legitimacy

The military continued to send Druze draftees to the Minority Unit between 1956 and 1972. During this period, Druze leaders became increasingly vocal in their insistence on having Druze soldiers contribute to Israel's war efforts, in order to prove their worth. In 1967, Druze leaders encouraged the disabled and exempted members of their community to demonstrate in front of the Israeli Defense Ministry in order to convince the IDF to recruit them so that they could help in the war. Neither the military nor the Druze leaders seriously believed that several dozen Druze would make a difference in a war that lasted only six days, but the Israeli press paid a lot of attention to this demonstration, thereby conveying a simple and clear message of Druze loyalty to the state.¹⁰³ This made the public and the politicians more sympathetic to the plight of the Druze in the IDF, hence lowering the costs for ethnic leaders to fight for their integration.

¹⁰² Yanai, 119.

¹⁰³ Peled, *Question of Loyalty*, 158-159.

The sharpest increase in legitimacy for the Druze soldiers came between 1968 and 1970, when the IDF was fighting the Palestine Liberation Organization's infiltration attempts in the Jordan valley. The military called in the Minority Unit, and when Druze soldiers suffered many casualties, the media and the larger Israeli public rediscovered and enthusiastically embraced the Israeli Druze community.¹⁰⁴ The death of a Druze Knesset member's son in battle was turned into a national event. Even though Ben-Gurion had retired as Prime Minister by then, he publicly proclaimed that "the pact between the Druze people and the Jewish people is not written on a scrap of paper . . . it is sanctified by the blood of Druze fighters." His statement received widespread attention and was publicized by the press over and over again.¹⁰⁵

In the early 1970s, ethnic leaders made use of this increased legitimacy to lobby the government to improve the conditions of the Druze in the IDF. Faced with an increasingly sympathetic audience of politicians, military leaders, and society at large, Druze leaders became increasingly aggressive in advocating for change. In 1972, a group of prominent Druze academics demanded that the IDF conscript the first class of Druze university graduates, arguing that the Druze had proven their worth as fellow Israelis in the battlefield. After persistent lobbying from ethnic leaders, the IDF relented.¹⁰⁶ Ben-Gurion was so convinced by the rhetorical persuasion of the Druze leaders that he wrote

¹⁰⁴ Ben-Dor, 132.

¹⁰⁵ Katzenell, 41.

¹⁰⁶ Peled, *Question of Loyalty*, 160-161.

in his personal diary, “We must allow every Druze to progress like the Jew. Every Druze officer must be allowed to serve in the paratroops [the elite unit of the IDF].”¹⁰⁷

The 1970s were also a particularly significant period for the Druze community, because many of the Druze soldiers who had served in the Minority Unit in the 1950s and 1960s began to retire in the 1970s—they then returned to their community and spearheaded the fight for greater Druze integration in the IDF. As Ben-Dor pointed out, “the political potential of a generation of discharged officers of that stature [having fought successfully in wars] is enormous.”¹⁰⁸ This group of retired officers who returned to advocate for integration included several Colonels, many of whom returned to their villages and assumed local political positions to fight for the rights of their kinsmen in the IDF.

These leaders were not willing to play by the rules of the old bargaining game—they threatened to persuade the Druze community to vote en bloc against political parties that did not promise significant integration of Druze soldiers in the IDF. Kamal Manssur observed this phenomenon and remarked that “the era of monologue with a small Druze group that had modest demands was over.”¹⁰⁹ The Druze leadership, emboldened with the increased legitimacy that came with battlefield success, prodded the state to move away from symbolic gestures and to adopt concrete actions, vowing that they would not relent on the pressure until their demands were met. As one prominent Druze leader

¹⁰⁷ Ben-Gurion Center, *Studies in the Establishment of Israel: A Collection of Problems in Zionism, the Yishuv, and the State of Israel* (Sede Boker: Ben-Gurion Center, 1992), 452.

¹⁰⁸ Ben-Dor, 147.

¹⁰⁹ Peled, *Question of Loyalty*, 161.

wrote, “one should fight and struggle, using every available democratic means to ensure that the demands for such rights will be fulfilled.”¹¹⁰ The high capability of Druze leaders, coupled with their high legitimacy, turned them into a driving force for Druze integration in the 1970s.

Analysis

The empirical cases of the Orientals and the Druze in Israel affirm the predictions made in the hypothesis to a large extent. Ethnic leaders with low capability, such as Oriental Jew leaders, were inactive in pressing for integration both during low and high legitimacy circumstances. When ethnic soldiers do not display any military value, there are high costs for ethnic leaders to advocate for their integration, as these leaders will have to expend precious political capital in persuading a highly skeptical audience (politicians, military leaders, society) of the legitimacy of the integration, with uncertain chances of success. It was therefore not surprising that Oriental leaders did not demand for integration of their kinsmen.

Even when Oriental soldiers demonstrated their worth through their increased literacy rates, educational attainment, and military aptitude scores, Oriental leaders were still handicapped in their ability to push for change, largely due to their limited political influence. There was visible evidence that Oriental leaders wanted change, but they were unable to actualize their desires in light of their political weakness. Their efforts were thus muted and futile, and they failed to become a driving force for integration.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 162.

In the case of the Druze leadership with high capability, we observed that they did not advocate for the integration of their kinsmen when there was widespread suspicion of the “Trojan horse” character of Druze soldiers, and persistent doubts about their military value. Ethnic leaders perceived high costs in advocating for the integration under such circumstances and chose not to press for ethnic reform in the armed forces. However, when Druze soldiers demonstrated their loyalty and military value in the 1970s, Druze leaders seized the opportunity to actively campaign for integration. The intensity of their lobbying efforts attracted widespread attention and sympathy within Israel.

While the two case studies largely support the hypothesis, they also raise certain issues that had not been anticipated in the theory. First, two incidents in the Druze case study described earlier deserve further examination: when Druze leaders actively encouraged disabled members of their community to stage demonstrations in order to convince the IDF to recruit them, and when a group of prominent Druze academics demanded that the IDF conscript the first class of Druze graduates so that they could serve their country. These two incidents show that ethnic leaders—especially those with high capabilities—are not just passive spectators who wait for their kinsmen to prove their worth in the military before beginning to fight for their rights. Instead, ethnic leaders with high capabilities can be active instigators who create opportunities for their kinsmen to demonstrate their loyalty to the state and their utility in the military. They recognize that there are certain necessary conditions that need to be in place before their kinsmen can “prove” anything—their kinsmen need to be at least slightly integrated in the military, and thus able to participate in real battles, in order to demonstrate their military value. Ethnic

leaders with high capabilities can strive to put these necessary conditions in place, so that their kinsmen can have a realistic chance of being integrated into the armed forces.

However, this observation begs the question: if politically influential ethnic leaders can attempt to create conditions for their kinsmen to prove their worth in the military, why did Druze leaders have to wait until the 1970s in order to fight to “create” these conditions? Why didn’t they do so in the 1950s or the 1960s, when they were also politically influential? One could argue that it ultimately boils down to the legitimacy calculus of ethnic leaders. In the 1950s and the 1960s, Druze soldiers performed disastrously in the battlefield, which earned them a very bad reputation. At that time, if ethnic leaders had wanted to “create conditions” for Druze soldiers to prove their worth in the military, they would have to expend significant amounts of political capital and incur very high costs, while being uncertain about their chances of success. Hence, ethnic leaders had to wait until the suspicions about Druze soldiers simmered down in the 1970s before using their political influence to create the conditions necessary for their kinsmen to prove their worth in the military. Therefore, ethnic leaders with high capability still require the presence of high legitimacy conditions before they decide to advocate for the rights of their kinsmen in the military.

Another issue raised in the empirical study that had not been anticipated in the theory is the existence of ethnic leaders who were formerly senior military officers. Empirically we witnessed this phenomenon with the retirement of a generation of Druze officers in the 1970s, who then returned to their villages to assume local political positions to advocate for the rights of the Druze. These retired officers—several of them who held the rank of Colonel—could be viewed as military leaders who later became

ethnic leaders. Where, then, do their loyalties lie—with the military or with their ethnic community? Should they be expected to fit the role of ethnic leaders, or military leaders, or both?

One could argue that when these people were still senior military officers, their loyalties were with the military organization, even though they were concurrently members of their ethnic community. The important point to note is that these senior military officers did not advocate for the rights of their kinsmen while they were still in active duty in the IDF. Their behavior adhered to the conception of the “professional” military officer identified by Huntington, who posited that military officers would act according to the functional interests of the military, regardless of the societal structures that they come from.¹¹¹ It was only after these Druze officers retired from the IDF did they return to their communities and fight for their parochial ethnic interests, fulfilling the role of ethnic leaders. Thus, even though an individual can be both an ethnic and a military leader at the same time, this observation is not incompatible with the core arguments in the theory. This is because the case has shown that while individuals can wear two hats at once, only one of these hats (military or ethnic leader) will be dominant at any one point in time, hence we can expect individuals to behave in a manner that is consistent with that dominant role.

¹¹¹ See page 18 of this thesis for a description of how military leaders are assumed to behave according to the “professional” and functionally rational model suggested by Weber, Huntington, and Rosen.

Conclusion

The empirical studies have largely corroborated the predictions made in the first stage of the theory. Military and ethnic leaders are shown to be driving forces in pushing for the integration of ethnic soldiers only when they have both high capability and high legitimacy in advocating for change. In all other scenarios, they will be inactive, either because they lack the political power to promote change, or because they lack the will to do so, or both. Understanding the conditions that prompt military and ethnic leaders to fight for change is only the first step in explaining how military manpower policy is amended in multiethnic states. The second stage of the theory predicts how ethnic and military leaders will bargain with each other, the role played by the political leadership in the negotiating process, and the outcomes of policy changes. These theoretical predictions will be placed under empirical scrutiny in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4

TESTING THE THEORY: THE DYNAMICS OF INTERACTION

This chapter uses four detailed case studies to test the second stage of the theory, which predicts how ethnic and military leaders will bargain with each other, and interact with the political leadership, to produce changes in military manpower policy. Based on the results of the first stage of the theory, ethnic and military leaders will find themselves in one of the following four scenarios in the negotiation process: (1) Military and ethnic leaders are both inactive; (2) Military leaders are driving forces, while ethnic leaders are inactive; (3) Military leaders are inactive, while ethnic leaders are driving forces; (4) Military and ethnic leaders are both driving forces.

The following table summarizes how the four case studies will be used to test the second stage of the theory.

Table 8. Testing How Military, Ethnic and Political Leaders Interact to Change Ethnic-Military Manpower Policy

		Military Leadership	
		Inactive	Driving force
Ethnic Leadership	Inactive	<p>1. Soviet Union (1945-1950)</p> <p>A: No impetus for change from either military or ethnic leadership</p> <p>B: Political leadership assumes decisive role. Lack of pressure for change from ethnic or military leadership means status quo is likely to be preserved</p> <p>C: No change in ethnic-military manpower policy; discrimination in the armed forces persists</p>	<p>2. South Africa (1970s)</p> <p>A: Impetus for change is likely to come from military leadership</p> <p>B: Political leadership is likely to yield to the demands of the military leadership</p> <p>C: Changes in ethnic-military manpower policy are likely to be military-directed; integration in armed forces occurs at a faster pace than what society can accept</p>
	Driving force	<p>3. United States (1945-1950)</p> <p>A: Impetus for change is likely to come from ethnic leadership</p> <p>B: Political leadership is likely to yield to the demands of the ethnic leadership</p> <p>C: Changes in ethnic-military manpower policy are likely to be socially-directed; integration in armed forces occurs at a faster pace than what the military can accept</p>	<p>4. Israel (1970s)</p> <p>A: Impetus for change comes from both military and ethnic leaderships</p> <p>B: Political leadership is likely to adjudicate when conflicting demands arise from military and ethnic leaderships</p> <p>C: Creative compromises in ethnic-military manpower policy are likely to occur between military and ethnic leaderships</p>

A: Nature of the change in ethnic-military manpower policy
B: Role of political leadership in the change process
C: Outcomes of the change in ethnic-military manpower policy

Source: Created by author

Quadrant 1: Military and Ethnic Leaders are both Inactive

Theory to be Tested

The theory is that if both ethnic and military leaderships are inactive, there will be no impetus for change in military manpower policy. The political leadership is likely to assume a decisive role, and the lack of pressure for change means that the status quo is likely to be preserved. There will be no change to ethnic-military manpower policy, and discrimination of ethnic soldiers will persist. This will be tested using the case study of the former Soviet Union from 1945 to 1950.

Background to Soviet Case Study

The Soviet Union, like most dictatorships, had military and ethnic leaderships that were inactive in pushing for changes in military manpower policy, and this was largely a result of the low capability status of both actors. In the case of the military leadership, there is general agreement amongst Soviet military scholars that the powerful role of the Communist Party significantly curtailed the autonomy of military leaders. Seweryn Bialer showed how Stalin perpetuated a system of political control within the armed forces through numerous devices, the chief of which was the institution of political officers or commissars.¹¹² These commissars served as direct representatives of the Party and the government in the armed forces, and wielded significant power in the decision-making processes of the military leadership, leading to a diminution of the professional officer's authority in determining military policy. The goal of the Communist Party was to ensure that the military leadership remained subservient to the dictates of the political

¹¹² Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin and his Generals* (New York: Western Publishing Company, 1969), 440-442.

leaders, hence there was very little autonomy for the Soviet military leadership to make independent decisions free from political constraints.

Ethnic minorities had very little voice in the political process, and ethnic leaders had no means to push for military manpower reforms in the armed forces.¹¹³ After the Second World War, the Soviet Union became one of the most authoritarian states, and there were no institutional mechanisms such as elections for ethnic minorities to make themselves heard. Protests or demonstrations by ethnic minorities were also brutally suppressed. Ethnic leaders had very low capability in the Soviet Union and were effectively shut out of the political process. There was thus very little they could do to push for the integration of their kinsmen in the Soviet military.

Ethnic Soldiers in the Red Army

The Soviet Union was a vast multinational empire. Within its borders lived approximately 200 million inhabitants (as of 1950) of whom about a quarter were non-Slavic. These non-Slavs came from more than one hundred distinct nationalities, most of which employed their own languages.¹¹⁴ Obviously, the cohort from which Soviet military manpower requirements must be drawn reflected this diversity; it was not homogeneously Slavic. Yet, for historical reasons, the Slavs dominated the military

¹¹³ The Polity Project, one of the widely used academic databases that codes the polity characteristics of states in the world system, rates the level of authoritarianism in the Soviet Union in the period from 1945 to 1950 as “10,” which was the maximum rating given to authoritarian states on a 1-10 scale. See *Polity IV Time-series Dataset* (Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2004).

¹¹⁴ A good ethnographic reference work is Ronald Wixman, *The Peoples of the USSR: An Ethnographic Handbook* (New York: M. E. Sharp, 1984).

establishment, securing the vast majority of leadership positions and staffing the most coveted military units.¹¹⁵ The cleavages between the Slavs and the non-Slavs were evident in many domains. For example, in the officer corps, Slavs were vastly over-represented and comprised about 90 percent of the corps.¹¹⁶ Non-Slavic nationalities were discriminated against and did not serve in combat units in numbers proportionate to their share of the general population. Unquestionably, the most limited non-Slavic representation was in the modern, high-technology services, such as the Air Force and Navy. Both these services had a clear Slavic preponderance, with a very large Russian majority. In sum, whether a soldier was Slavic or non-Slavic had a decisive influence on his opportunities in the Soviet military.¹¹⁷

During World War II non-Slavic soldiers had to be mobilized for combat in great numbers as military manpower was in strong demand.¹¹⁸ These minorities participated in critical battles such as Moscow, Stalingrad, Caucasus, and Kursk, as well as in campaigns to regain control over the Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic, contributing to the defense of the Soviet Union during the war.¹¹⁹ The question of how effectively the minorities actually participated in combat is very difficult to answer. Soviet sources are mostly

¹¹⁵ Alexander Alexiev and Enders Wimbush, *Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 121.

¹¹⁶ The Russians comprised about 80 percent of officers, while Ukrainians and Belorussians made up about 10 percent. Alexiev and Wimbush, 153.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 121-125.

¹¹⁸ Curran and Ponomareff, 51.

¹¹⁹ Alexander Alexiev and Enders Wimbush, *Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 60.

reticent on this topic, and very little information is publicly available to gauge the combat efficacy of ethnic minorities during the Second World War. However, one may expect that in the aftermath of World War II, Soviet military leaders would have recognized the functional necessity of integrating ethnic minorities in the Red Army—particularly at a time when the Soviet population was severely depleted (more than 20 million deaths), and when more manpower was needed to defend the Soviet Union against external threats that had developed with the onset of the Cold War.

More of the Same

Rather than getting rewarded for their contributions during the Second World War, ethnic minorities found their prospects in the military no different from pre-World War II conditions. Significant discrimination persisted for non-Slavs who were conscripted into the Soviet military in the post-war period. For instance, less than 15 percent of the troops conscripted into combat units in the late 1940s were non-Slavic, while they made up 70 to 90 percent of the troops in non-combat units. Non-Slavs who served in combat units were often relegated to support roles, such as in the kitchen or in the warehouses. Non-Slavs were also dramatically under-represented in the most sensitive services, such as the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Special Forces, the Air Force, and the Navy. The situation was similar when it came to leadership positions within the Red Army. After 1945, the Soviet officer corps became more homogeneously Slavic instead of becoming more ethnically diverse. For the few officers who were non-Slavic, none was promoted above the rank of Major. Thus, it was clear that both the horizontal

and vertical discrimination of ethnic minorities persisted in the Soviet military in the aftermath of World War II.¹²⁰

The Non-Autonomous Military Leadership

Research suggests that the Soviet military leadership possessed little autonomy in determining ethnic policies within the armed forces. Specific instructions governing the conscription of ethnic minorities were passed down from the political leadership to the military leaders, who were obliged to obey the dictates of their political masters. In the post-war period, the Supreme Soviet formulated a secret directive, entitled “Concerning the Principle of Staffing in the Soviet Armed Forces,” that described the “distrust” of the political leadership towards Central Asians, and stated that combat units should consist of a majority of soldiers coming from the core Slavic states and only small percentages from “the unstable nations.”¹²¹ Additionally, the Kremlin ordered the military leadership to institute a new extraterritorial stationing principle, which mandated that ethnic minorities could not serve in their native regions. The rationale was that if ethnic soldiers were stationed in the same area as their kinsmen, they might be inclined to side with the local population against the Russian authorities during serious internal crises or uprisings.¹²² These ethnic policies were part of the political leadership’s divide-and-rule approach to exploit ethnic animosities for the goal of preserving the stability of the political regime.

¹²⁰ Enders Wimbush and Alexander Alexiev, “The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces” (Rand Corporation Research Study, March 1982), 15-16, 22-23.

¹²¹ Alexiev and Wimbush, *Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army*, 131.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 139-140.

As these examples demonstrate, the priorities of the Kremlin leadership were clear from the beginning: the Soviet military was viewed not only as a traditional defender of national security from foreign threats, but also “the ultimate guarantor of the continued political hegemony of the Communist Party.”¹²³ Ethnic policies that were passed down from the Kremlin to the military authorities were not designed with the Huntingtonian “professional” goal of maximizing military strength. Rather, these ethnic policies were motivated by political interests, and were designed to strengthen the control of the political leadership over their vast multiethnic state. The recruitment, stationing, and promotion of ethnic soldiers within the Red Army certainly did not promote any meaningful degree of integration.

An Emasculated Ethnic Leadership

While military leaders lacked the autonomy to change military manpower policies according to professional considerations, ethnic leaders also did not have the institutional means to push for greater integration in the Soviet military. Pennar argued that ethnic leaders who attempted to speak out on this issue were decisively silenced—or purged—by the Communist Party.¹²⁴ Bennigsen's examination of the Islamic minority in the Soviet Union corroborated this claim, demonstrating how Islamic leaders were powerless in promoting the equal treatment of Islamic soldiers in the Soviet military. Those that tried

¹²³ Ibid., 138.

¹²⁴ Jaan Pennar, “Nationalism in the Soviet Baltics,” in *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, ed. Erich Goldhagen (New York: Praeger, 1968), 207.

to do so found themselves intimidated and harassed by the police.¹²⁵ The lack of democratic channels meant that the marginalized ethnicities did not have a conduit to push for changes, and political leaders in the Kremlin faced very little pressure from ethnic leaders to halt discriminatory practices against ethnic soldiers in the post-war period.

Analysis

The Soviet case study strongly supports the theory. When both the military and ethnic leaderships are inactive in pressing for changes, the political leadership assumes a decisive role in determining military manpower policies within the armed forces. The lack of pressure from both military and ethnic leaders meant that there was very little incentive for the political leaders to alter the status quo. Furthermore, the political elites recognized that the existing discrimination against ethnic minorities in the armed forces served their vested interests as it kept the distrusted ethnic minorities away from combat arms and forced them to keep check on each other through the extraterritorial stationing principle. For the rationalist-minded political leadership, the existing ethnic policies within the armed forces helped to perpetuate regime survival by crippling the ability of ethnic minorities to unite in armed rebellion against the state. The convergence of the abovementioned factors resulted in minimal changes in military manpower policies and a persistence of discriminatory practices against ethnic soldiers in the post-war period.

While the Soviet case study affirmed the theory to a large extent, it also raised certain unanticipated issues. First, the theoretical construct posits that the discrimination

¹²⁵ Alexandre Bennigsen, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), 199-202.

against ethnic minorities would be maintained because political leaders faced a “lack of pressure” from ethnic or military leaders for change. The implication is that political leaders are reactive actors who, due to an absence of stimulus from the ethnic and military leaderships, can afford to maintain the policy of ethnic discrimination in the armed forces.

The Soviet case study showed that in some cases, political leaders may maintain the status quo as a deliberate policy, in order to protect their vested interests and to preserve the survival of the regime. Dictators fear internal rebellions by ethnic minorities, and they will do whatever they can to prevent them from occurring. Hence, it is in the rational interest of dictatorial regimes not to train ethnic minorities for combat, and to relegate them to menial positions in the armed forces, so that the chances of an armed insurgency by ethnic minorities are minimized. Furthermore, dictators find it in their interest to exploit the primordial animosities of the various ethnic groups to ensure that they keep check on one another. Such a divide-and-rule approach could be seen in how the Soviets adopted the extraterritorial stationing principle to prevent ethnic soldiers from siding with their own kinsmen against the Soviet authorities. Therefore, the case study has shown that there are strong, positive reasons why the political leadership in such states may want to maintain the policy of ethnic discrimination in the armed forces, as this policy can be used as an instrument of state control and a way to perpetuate the regime’s survival. The decision by the political leaders to maintain ethnic discrimination in the armed forces was facilitated by a lack of opposition from military and ethnic leaders, but this should not obscure the proactive (rather than reactive) nature of the decision. This is a nuanced—but important—refinement of the proposed theory.

This case study also refined the theory by raising the issue of the internal dimensions of national security that was largely ignored in the theoretical construct. The proposed theory focuses on the contributions of ethnic minorities to external war efforts and how existing military manpower policy affects the military's ability to respond effectively to foreign threats. However, the Soviet case showed that political leaders also consider how military manpower policy affects internal stability when determining whether to implement ethnic reforms in the armed forces. Subordinate ethnic groups are frequently excluded on the grounds that arming their members could be dangerous to the domestic status quo. The Soviet political leadership decided that exploiting the primordial animosities of ethnic minorities and perpetuating their discrimination through the extraterritorial stationing principle could enhance the internal stability of their vast multiethnic state, and thus there was very little incentive to alter the status quo. Thus, the potential external benefits that integration would bring to the armed forces (e.g. providing more manpower in combat units to deal with external threats) were balanced with the potential internal costs of integration (e.g. increased chances of internal rebellion by ethnic minorities who are trained and armed). Governments weigh both the external and internal effects of ethnic reforms before deciding if ethnic minorities should be integrated into the armed forces, or whether discriminatory practices against them should persist.

Finally, the Soviet case study showed that the political and military leaderships could be integrated to a certain extent, as quite a number of Politburo members have had significant prior military experience. One of the most notable Soviet generals in World War II, Georgy Zhukov, was subsequently a candidate member of the Politburo in 1957. Andrei Grechko was another pure-blooded military man who eventually ascended into

the Politburo via a military career.¹²⁶ Besides Zhukov and Grechko, a number of other Politburo members have had prior military experience. Bulganin was a Colonel-General and a member of the State Committee of Defense, before being appointed Defense Minister and subsequently Premier of the Soviet Union. Chubar, Kaganovich and Zhdanov served in the Tsarist army, but none of them was an officer. Thirteen members of the Politburo took part in the Revolution and the Civil War, but mostly as political commissars who were supervising the officers on behalf of the Party.¹²⁷ During the Second World War, Khrushchev was a political commissar at various fronts, Voroshilov carried out important missions for the supreme command and Brezhnev was political commissar of the 18th Army.¹²⁸ These examples show the complexities of the political-military relationship in the Soviet Union. Even though the political leadership wielded paramount authority, many of the pinnacle political leaders have had significant prior military experience, thus it could be argued that the political and military leaderships were integrated to a certain extent.

Quadrant 2: Military Leadership as Driving Force and Ethnic Leadership as Inactive

Theory to be Tested

The theory is that if the military leadership is a driving force while the ethnic leadership is inactive, the impetus for change will come from the military leadership. The

¹²⁶ John Lowenhardt, *The Soviet Politburo* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1978), 60-62.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 61.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 62.

political leadership is likely to yield to the demands of the military leadership. Changes to military manpower policy will be military-directed, and integration in the armed forces will occur at a faster pace than what society can accept. This will be tested using the case study of South Africa in the 1970s.

Background to South African Case Study

As chapter 3 demonstrated, the military leaders in the South African Defense Force (SADF) became the driving force for integrating black soldiers in the 1970s as their high capability status coincided with high legitimacy in advocating for change during that decade.

Their forceful advocacy contrasted with the inactive status of black leaders in South Africa in pushing for ethnic reforms in the military. The passivity of black leaders was due primarily to their low capability status. In the era of apartheid, blacks in South Africa did not have the right to vote, and their disenfranchisement meant that the black community had very little political influence as politicians did not have to pander to their demands.¹²⁹ To exacerbate the problem, senior government positions were completely monopolized by white Afrikaners, hence there was no black voice in the upper echelons of power. When the black community attempted to make their demands heard by organizing violent resistance through the African National Congress (ANC) in the mid-1960s, they were brutally suppressed by the police.¹³⁰ Faced with no means of advocating

¹²⁹ Martin Meredith, *In the Name of Apartheid: South Africa in the Postwar Period* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988), 70.

¹³⁰ Richard Leonard, *South Africa at War: White Power and the Crisis in Southern Africa* (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1983), 57.

for the rights of their kinsmen, black leaders had very limited political influence, and they were thus inactive in pressing for ethnic reforms in the SADF.

The Impetus for Change

The impetus for ethnic reform originated not from the political leadership—which still firmly believed in the ideology of apartheid—but from the SADF leadership. Three major factors caused SADF leaders to recognize the functional necessity of integrating black soldiers in the 1970s:

1. Rapid changes in demographic balance between the white and black populations in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in a lack of white manpower for the SADF.
2. An increasingly hostile external environment for South Africa in the 1970s, due to its tense relations with South West Africa (present-day Namibia) and Angola.
3. The excellent combat performance of black soldiers in the South West Africa war from 1974 to 1976.

SADF leaders were convinced that the integration of black soldiers was essential in optimizing the strength of the armed forces, and these functional incentives led them to forcefully press for change. For example, General R.C. Hiemstram, Commandant-General of the SADF from 1965-1972, proclaimed that the SADF could not be strong enough to defend South Africa against external threats if ethnic reforms were not implemented, and argued that changes in ethnic-military manpower policy were

inevitable.¹³¹ Lieutenant General Magnus Malan, the Chief of Army from 1973 to 1976 and subsequently the Chief of the SADF from 1976 to 1980, argued that ethnic reform was critical if the SADF were to successfully fulfill its duty of defending the South African state against external aggression.¹³² In their attempts to promote ethnic reforms within the SADF, military leaders naturally came into contact with political and ethnic leaders.

Interaction between the Military and Political Leaderships

Since they swept to power in 1948, the South African Nationalists had relentlessly pursued the policy of apartheid in all domains of South African life. To the political leaders, the military was perceived as another domain in which the separation of whites and blacks could be further applied.¹³³ For example, Defense Minister P.W. Botha declared in Parliament in 1970 that “as far as the Bantu [blacks] are concerned, we say that we shall employ them only in certain auxiliary services as laborers . . . we shall not employ them within the context of the South African Defense Forces in any fighting capacity.”¹³⁴ According to South African political leaders, ethnic-military manpower policy should follow a simple formula: whites should be conscripted into combat units

¹³¹ Deon Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making* (Johannesburg: MacMillan South Africa, 1984), 143.

¹³² Peled, *A Question of Loyalty*, 41.

¹³³ Meredith, 62-75.

¹³⁴ Republic of South Africa, *House of Assembly Debates*, Vol. 30, 31 August 1970, col. 2939.

and serve in command positions, while blacks should only be voluntarily recruited into non-combat units and serve non-command positions.¹³⁵

While military leaders saw no reason to alter the status quo in the 1950s and 1960s due to their perception of the low military value of black soldiers, events in the 1970s caused them to re-evaluate the military utility of black soldiers. Presented with strong functional incentives for integrating the blacks in the armed forces, SADF leaders began to challenge the existing ethnic-military manpower policy that was supported by political leaders. General Malan, the Chief of Army, was particularly active in exerting pressure on Defense Minister Botha to alter his views on the role of blacks in the SADF. He provided Botha with military papers and internal reports explaining the need for ethnic reform, and persuaded Botha that the SADF needed to recruit more black combat soldiers, and to do so quickly in light of changing external conditions.¹³⁶

Under pressure from the military leadership, Botha agreed in 1973 to a series of ethnic reforms that were completely at odds with the state ideology of apartheid. For example, Botha agreed to invite nonwhite servicemen to apply for officers' school, a significant concession for a politician that had long resisted the idea that blacks could fill leadership positions in any domain of South African life. In an attempt to minimize the backlash from conservative elements within the Nationalist party, Botha affirmed that nonwhites who were commissioned as officers would not be saluted by white soldiers, arguing that "they would have command over their own people, but I would not allow

¹³⁵ Grundy, *Soldiers Without Politics*, 199.

¹³⁶ Peled, "Soldiers Apart," 231.

them to be in command of white soldiers . . . under our system we shall allow only white officers to be in charge of white soldiers.”¹³⁷

The declaration by Botha riled military leaders, who perceived it as an attempt by the civilian political apparatus to interfere in the organizational doctrines of the SADF. Military leaders also perceived the “non-salute clause” as undermining the very nature of military hierarchy and control, and thus they exerted strong pressure on the political leadership to abolish this clause. In 1975, Botha passed an amendment in Parliament reversing the “non-salute” policy, obliging whites to salute and obey the authority of nonwhite officers.¹³⁸ This example demonstrated the significant level of power wielded by the SADF leadership and its ability to influence political leaders to amend ethnic policies that were perceived as being detrimental to the professional interests of the SADF.

Although the political leadership did make many concessions to the SADF with regard to ethnic-military manpower policy, it was unclear what their primary motivations were. By the mid-1970s, there was strong evidence to suggest that Botha himself became very fearful of a large-scale conventional invasion of South Africa by its northern neighbors, accompanied by widespread ANC-organized internal unrest. He thus called on South Africans to formulate “a total national strategy at the highest level,” and the SADF’s role was to develop the manpower, war plans, and doctrine “to fight a total

¹³⁷ Republic of South Africa, *House of Assembly Debates*, Vol. 33, 22 April 1973, col. 4584.

¹³⁸ Grundy, *Soldiers Without Politics*, 189-190.

war.”¹³⁹ It was possible that the political leadership became increasingly amenable to changes in ethnic-military manpower policy because it recognized that if the military did not reform, it would not be able to handle the threats confronting South Africa—and the collapse of the country would naturally mean the collapse of the existing government. Hence, it could be argued that beginning in the mid-1970s, the interests of military leaders to maximize military strength began to directly overlap with the interests of political leaders to ensure the survival of the state—and of their regime—at a time of high external threats. Therefore, even though the political leadership yielded to the military leadership in allowing ethnic reforms in the SADF, it was uncertain if these concessions were primarily a result of power differentials or a result of converging interests.

Interaction between the Military and Ethnic Leaderships

Even though black leaders were politically emasculated, they understood that the SADF needed their tacit support in order to recruit more black soldiers, and they made use of this bargaining chip to extract certain concessions from the military leadership. Sonny Leon, an influential ethnic leader, argued, “If our men are being trained to fight on our borders, they must have something meaningful to look forward to when they return.”¹⁴⁰ His statement represented an implicit threat that black leaders might withdraw their support for the recruitment of black soldiers if the military did not move fast enough to promote integration. Since there were six thousand black applicants who had—through

¹³⁹ Willem Steenkamp, “The South African Defense Force: Rogue Elephant, Slave of Circumstance, or Cyclops in the Land of the Blind?” *Leadership SA* 2, no. 4 (Summer 1983): 56, 66.

¹⁴⁰ Peled, *A Question of Loyalty*, 79.

the tacit endorsement of black leaders—applied to join the SADF, military leaders feared that ethnic leaders might potentially withdraw their patronage and precipitate a fall in black recruitment in the armed forces if their demands for integration were completely unheeded.

One black officer described how Sonny Leon’s rhetoric affected the attitudes of senior SADF officers towards the integration of black soldiers: “General Meyer, the personnel boss of the Defense Force, knew that he had a complement of [black] people in the Defense Force, and that if he did not take them along, they might just leave the military and join the radicals, and that was not in the interest of the state.”¹⁴¹ Even though black leaders in South Africa were politically weak, they possessed an important weapon, which was the ability to use their status as community leaders to dissuade their kinsmen from joining the military. Hence, it was in the interest of military leaders to cultivate good relations with ethnic leaders where possible, and to rely on their support to attract a steady stream of black recruits.

There were several examples of how SADF leaders attempted to cultivate goodwill with ethnic leaders. For instance, in 1979, black leaders were specially invited to visit the camp of the all-black 21st Battalion after the unit had completed three successful tours of duty in South West Africa. During the visit, black leaders proposed the idea of creating a network of military schools where black soldiers could study and hence upgrade their education. The SADF viewed it as a reasonable request from ethnic leaders, perceiving it as a good opportunity for building goodwill with the black leadership, while producing better-educated black soldiers at the same time. Shortly after

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 81.

the request was made, the SADF established a network of Adult Education Centers in SADF ethnic units, to cater to the educational needs of black soldiers.¹⁴² For military leaders, such acquiescence was a low-cost way of building trust with the ethnic leadership and securing their support for a continual stream of black recruits into the SADF, so as to maximize the overall strength of the armed forces.

The Process of Change

The large degree of autonomy enjoyed by the military leadership enabled it to make changes in ethnic policies without significant constraints from the political leadership. Under the direction of the Chief of Army, General Malan, the SADF engaged in a vigorous effort to boost ethnic integration from the mid-1970s. For example, the 21st Battalion was created specifically for combat purposes, staffed and led entirely by black soldiers. When General Malan was promoted to Chief of Staff of the SADF, he ordered the Chief of Army to continue with ethnic experimentation, including preparing black companies to fight alongside white companies in joint operations, vastly increasing the number of black cadets admitted into officer school, and ultimately assimilating black soldiers into white combat units to form ethnically heterogeneous battalions.¹⁴³

By the end of the decade, the SADF had made significant progress in integrating blacks into the SADF, both horizontally and vertically. For instance, the Navy had broken the traditional segregation order and allowed whites and nonwhites to work shoulder to shoulder on combat ships; the all-black South African Cape Corps (SACC) had attained

¹⁴² Peled, *Question of Loyalty*, 83.

¹⁴³ Grundy, *Soldiers Without Politics*, 127-128.

the status of a first-class operational infantry unit; and black officers were promoted in rank and position just like their white peers.¹⁴⁴ Even more significantly, military bases in combat zones had become completely integrated—white and black soldiers fought, ate, and slept together.¹⁴⁵

The upper echelons of military leadership became increasingly vocal about the necessity to abandon rigid racist patterns of behavior and to maximize the strength of the military through ethnic integration. Admiral Ronald Edwards unabashedly proclaimed in an interview with *The New York Times*, “We are chipping away at things that have encrusted themselves onto our national life over the years.”¹⁴⁶ Even more openly critical of the flaws of apartheid was Major General G. Boshoff, Chief of Army Logistics. “We will never be able to withstand modern threats unless all of South Africa strived for solidarity and formed a solid communal front against outside attack,” he said. “We must recognize that today there is no basic difference in the lifestyle of the black and white man.”¹⁴⁷ The functional necessity of integrating blacks had trumped political considerations, and the highly autonomous military leadership became the locomotive for the integration of blacks into the armed forces.

¹⁴⁴ C. J. Nothling, “Blacks, Coloreds, and Indians in the South African Defense Forces,” *South African International* 11, no. 1 (July 1980): 26.

¹⁴⁵ Robert Jaster, “South African Defense Strategy and the Growing Influence of the Military,” in *Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa’s International Relations*, ed. William Foltz and Henry Bienen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 135.

¹⁴⁶ *The New York Times*, 16 September 1979.

¹⁴⁷ Grundy, *Soldiers Without Politics*, 131.

Outcomes of Ethnic Reform

The integration of the blacks into the SADF could be said to have proceeded at a faster pace than what the white population in South Africa was prepared to accept. For many whites, the recruitment and desegregation of the blacks in the SADF was a far-fetched idea. Since 1949, blacks had been restricted to menial positions in the military and had received minimal firearms training. The idea of training blacks with live firearms and providing weapons to black soldiers was simply unacceptable to many whites, especially those in rural areas.¹⁴⁸ A manifestation of this distrust can be seen in 1968, when the South African Parliament passed the Dangerous Weapons Act that deprived blacks from the ownership of weapons.¹⁴⁹ Thus, it was clear that the whites were not prepared for the radical changes in ethnic-military manpower policy that were launched by the SADF leadership in the 1970s.

Further evidence supporting the argument that integration in the SADF proceeded at a faster pace than what the white population was ready to accept could be gathered from the public announcements made by the SADF and the South African government. Because of the fear of losing the support of the politically empowered white population, political and military leaders had to mask the controversial process of integration behind a veil of denials and ambiguous statements. For example, when the Chief of Army General Dutton announced to the press in 1974 that the army had finished training the first batch of black combat soldiers, he assured his audience that no integrated units were contemplated. This was a blatantly false declaration since plans for ethnically

¹⁴⁸ Peled, "Soldiers Apart," 241.

¹⁴⁹ Grundy, *Soldiers Without Politics*, 42.

heterogeneous battalions were already in an advanced stage of preparation.¹⁵⁰ In spite of Dutton's deceptive announcement, the white population was alarmed at the policy of arming blacks, and newspaper stories bearing headlines such as “Won't they turn the guns on us?” began appearing in the South African press.¹⁵¹ Throughout the 1970s, official statements of the SADF remained one step behind the ongoing process of ethnic experimentation in order to minimize the backlash from the whites. This suggests that both the SADF and the South African government had recognized that integration in the SADF was occurring at a faster rate than what the white society was prepared to accept, and therefore they had to take measures to dampen societal anxiety.

Analysis

The case study of South Africa largely corroborates the predictions made in the theory. It demonstrates that when military leaders who have high capability and high legitimacy interact with ethnic leaders who are inactive, the impetus for change would come from the military leaders. It also produces evidence that the political leadership in such cases will yield to the demands of the military leadership, producing military-directed ethnic reforms. These reforms occur at a faster pace than what society can accept because the changes are guided by the functional requirements of the military rather than by a consideration of what is a palatable pace of integration for society.

The lesson learned from this case study is that ethnic soldiers can be meaningfully integrated in the military, even in countries with weak political and ethnic leaders, if

¹⁵⁰ Peled, “Soldiers Apart,” 245.

¹⁵¹ *Sunday Express*, 16 July 1974.

senior military officers begin to equate the promotion of these soldiers with an overall improvement in military strength. Under such conditions, ethnic soldiers may do even better in the military than in society at large. However, the South Africa case also refined the theoretical framework in three ways.

Firstly, it suggested that even in cases where ethnic leaders have low capability and are thus considered weak, military leaders may still have an incentive to gain their support and to cultivate good relations with them. This is because politically weak ethnic leaders still retain the unique ability to affect the motivations of their kinsmen, and their tacit support is usually required before their kinsmen apply in large numbers for voluntary positions in the military. Certainly, a military leadership that is powerful can resort to forced conscription of ethnic soldiers if it were desperate for manpower, but this will usually result in poorly motivated ethnic recruits who do not become good combat soldiers. Hence, for functionally rational purposes, strong military leaderships may still want to draw the support of weak ethnic leaderships. This refines the original theory, which presupposes that inactive ethnic leaders would become irrelevant and useless in the process of integration. In reality, it is still in the interest of military leaders to gain their support in order for the military to attract the largest number of well-motivated ethnic soldiers.

Secondly, the proposed theory suggests that when the military leadership is powerful and acts as a driving force, the political leadership will yield to their demands of amending military manpower policy as the politicians do not want to risk conflict with the military and possibly be overthrown. However, the case study has shown that political leaders themselves may have self-interested motivations for amending military

manpower policy, and thus their concessions to military leaders may not be a result of power differentials, but a consequence of converging interests between the political and military elites. Functionally-rational political leaders may support the military leaders' goal of maximizing military strength—even if it comes at the expense of their cherished political ideology such as apartheid—if a maximally-powerful military is capable of ensuring the survival of the state at a time of high external threats, thus enabling political leaders to maintain their grip on power. This observation of converging interests refines the original theory, which had emphasized power differentials as the major explanatory variable to account for the concessions made by the political leadership to military leaders.

Thirdly, the theory suggests that states falling into this quadrant will see integration in the military occurring at a faster pace than what society is prepared to accept. The South African case study refines this claim by requiring a more precise definition of the term “society.” Integration in the SADF occurred at a faster pace than what the white population was prepared to accept—the black population would have conceivably been supportive of such rapid integration. Hence, when making the claim that “society” may not be prepared to accept the pace of integration, it is critical to first define what “society” means. The theoretical argument is largely robust but it needs to be more precisely defined when applied empirically.

Quadrant 3: Military Leadership as Inactive and Ethnic Leadership as Driving Force

Theory to be Tested

The theory is that if the ethnic leadership is a driving force and the military leadership is inactive, the impetus to change will come from the ethnic leadership. The political leadership is likely to yield to the demands of the ethnic leadership. Changes in ethnic-military manpower policy are likely to be socially-directed, and integration in the armed forces will occur at a faster pace than what the military can accept. This will be tested using the case study of the US from 1945 to 1950.

Background to US Case Study

The low capability status of US military leaders caused them to be inactive in pressing for the integration of black soldiers in the armed forces, even in the aftermath of World War II when there was high legitimacy in advocating for change due to the excellent combat performance of black soldiers. In contrast, leaders of the black community in the US could be described as having high capability. Although senior government positions were still overwhelmingly staffed by whites in the 1945 to 1950 period, black leaders in the US—unlike those in South Africa—had the unique advantage of being situated in a highly democratic state, where voters could be mobilized to cast their ballot against politicians who made decisions that were antithetical to the interests of their community.¹⁵² In particular, the 1948 US Presidential elections were keenly fought

¹⁵² The Polity Project rated the level of democracy in the US in the period from 1945 to 1950 as “10,” which was the maximum rating given to democratic states on a 1-10 scale. See *Polity IV Time-series Dataset* (Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2004).

between the incumbent Harry Truman and his Republican opponent Thomas Dewey, and black voters in the North were especially important to the Democrats in this election.¹⁵³ Additionally, the contributions made by black soldiers to the success of World War II were widely covered in the American press, leading to an increase in the legitimacy for integrating black soldiers in the armed forces. The increase in legitimacy made it less costly for black leaders to fight for the rights of black servicemen. Thus, black leaders had a strong incentive to press for change, causing them to become driving forces for ethnic reform in the US armed forces in the aftermath of the Second World War.

The Impetus for Change

The military value of black soldiers that was demonstrated during World War II provided military leaders with strong functional reasons to press for ethnic reforms, in order to maximize the strength of the armed forces. However, the Gillem Report that was submitted by the military leadership to the Truman administration—proposing increased integration in the armed forces—was flatly rejected in 1946. The reason why Truman rejected the proposal was unclear. One possible explanation was that in 1946, there were other urgent priorities that confronted the government in the aftermath of World War II, and that Truman did not want to expend precious political capital to fight for the integration of blacks in the military when it was still not politically expedient to do so, especially when it was still two years before the presidential elections. Additionally, Truman's private views on race at that point in time were still marked by a casual racism. For example, in a letter to his wife in June 1946, he displayed insensitive racial

¹⁵³ Records were reviewed by the author from the Harry Truman Presidential Library and Museum in Independence, MO, during a research trip on April 4, 2015.

language.¹⁵⁴ Given these confluence of factors, efforts by military leaders to advocate for ethnic reforms were rebuffed by Truman, showing the limits of military influence in the upper echelons of American political power.

Even though the proposals in the Gillem Report were rejected in 1946, black groups continued to put pressure on the Truman administration for changes in military manpower policy. Dissatisfaction with the existing ethnic policy of the armed forces was a galvanizing factor for the increasingly militant and powerful civil rights movement. Beginning in 1947, civil rights groups shifted their strategy. Rather than relying solely on the orderly petitioning of the government and of the judiciary for a redress of their grievances, civil rights leaders began to stress mass action and civil disobedience.¹⁵⁵ For example, black leaders threatened to mobilize the black community to boycott the draft in 1948, heralding a shift in strategy of the civil rights movement to a more militant kind. That same year, prominent black leaders established the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training, whose goal was to “encourage civil disobedience if discrimination and segregation in the armed forces did not cease.”¹⁵⁶

This transformation in the civil rights movement was made possible because of the growing urbanization of the black population. The increased concentration of blacks

¹⁵⁴ As a senator from 1935 to 1944, Truman never expressed enthusiasm for civil rights. As President, his support for civil rights only became apparent starting from 1947, when race became an important issue in the run-up to the 1948 Presidential elections. Records were reviewed by the author from the Harry Truman Presidential Library and Museum in Independence, MO, during a research trip on April 4, 2015.

¹⁵⁵ Morris MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History of the United States Army, 1981), 124.

¹⁵⁶ MacGregor, 124-126.

in urban centers and the growth of the black press in the late 1940s made it easier for ethnic leaders to communicate with their community and to coordinate mass action such as protests and boycotts.¹⁵⁷ Besides such acts of civil disobedience, ethnic leaders also used the threat of the ballot box to put pressure on the political leadership for ethnic reform in the military. For example, black leaders threatened to mobilize the community to vote as a bloc in key districts if their demands for the integration of black servicemen were not addressed.¹⁵⁸

The threat of the ballot box was particularly salient in view of Truman's impending elections in 1948—Richard Hope argues that “there was no doubt that he [Truman] needed the solid support of the black voters in order to get re-elected.”¹⁵⁹ In particular, the Northern blacks were a critical bloc of Democrat voters and Truman recognized that they could not be alienated.¹⁶⁰ Confronted with the incessant demands of civil rights activists, Truman agreed to launch a review of the status of black soldiers in the armed forces. When Truman's Republican opponent in the 1948 Presidential elections, Thomas Dewey, resolved in his campaign platform to be “opposed to the idea

¹⁵⁷ E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro in the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1957), 512-513.

¹⁵⁸ Kenneth Clark, “The Civil Rights Movement: Momentum and Organization,” *Daedalus* 95 (Winter 1966): 240-247.

¹⁵⁹ Richard Hope, *Racial Strife in the US Military* (New York: Praeger, 1979), 30.

¹⁶⁰ Records were reviewed by the author from the Harry Truman Presidential Library and Museum in Independence, MO, during a research trip on April 4, 2015.

of racial segregation in the armed forces,” Truman realized that he had no choice but to take strong and immediate action to win the black vote in order to ensure re-election.¹⁶¹

In June 1947, Truman became the first President to address the annual conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), during which he took a strongly supportive stance on civil rights.¹⁶² In July 1948—four months before the Presidential elections—Truman announced Executive Order 9981 in an effort to appease civil rights activists and to win the black vote. It mandated the “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Armed Forces,” called for the complete elimination of segregation in the military, and stipulated that these policies “be put into effect *as rapidly as possible*.”¹⁶³ The growing political power of the black community and the threat of mass action in the postwar period were important reasons for the breakthrough in ethnic reform in the military. As Lanning argues, “The president was first and foremost a politician and, like most elected leaders, tended to take only stances that ensured winning elections. Although concerned about discrimination against blacks both in and out of the military, Truman did little as president to right past wrongs until it

¹⁶¹ Michael Lanning, *The African-American Soldier: From Crispus Attucks to Colin Powell* (Secaucus, NJ: Carol Publishing Group, 1997), 219-221.

¹⁶² Records were reviewed by the author from the Harry Truman Presidential Library and Museum in Independence, MO, during a research trip on April 4, 2015.

¹⁶³ Charles Moskos, *All that we can be: Black leadership and racial integration the Army way* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 30.

became politically expedient to do so.”¹⁶⁴ Truman ultimately won the Presidential election, garnering 77 percent of the black vote.¹⁶⁵

The Process of Change

In the process of amending military manpower policy, the different interests of ethnic and military leaders became quickly apparent, leading to tensions between the two actors. Military leaders emphasized the efficiency and performance of the armed forces to the exclusion of social concerns.¹⁶⁶ Even though they supported the integration of black soldiers into the armed forces for professional reasons, they insisted that changes be made gradually and progressively in order to give the organization sufficient time to adapt.¹⁶⁷ Civil rights groups, on the other hand, were using the political opportunity arising from the impending Presidential elections of 1948 to demand immediate and complete integration, with little regard for how organizationally feasible such changes would be for the military. “Neither group seemed able to appreciate the other’s real concerns,” writes MacGregor.¹⁶⁸ This conflicting relationship between the ethnic and military leadership was resolved when Truman issued Executive Order 9981 in 1948, which stipulated that

¹⁶⁴ Lanning, 220.

¹⁶⁵ Zachary Karabell, *The Last Campaign: How Harry Truman Won the 1948 Election* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2000), 69.

¹⁶⁶ MacGregor, 131.

¹⁶⁷ Even the Gillem Report of 1945, which called for the integration of blacks into the armed forces, emphasized that changes had to be made *progressively*, with the *eventual* aim of attaining maximum manpower efficiency. Jack Foner, *Blacks and the Military in American history: A New Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1974), 176-179.

¹⁶⁸ MacGregor, 123.

integration in the armed forces were be put into effect “as rapidly as possible.” The broad alignment of Executive Order 9981 with the demands of the black leadership was a clear sign that the electoral interests of the black community were more influential for Truman than the professional interests of the military leadership, since the former was essential to getting him re-elected while the latter was not.

Most military leaders—even those who had initially supported the Gillem Report—found the changes mandated by Executive Order 9981 to be too rapid and too sudden for their organization. While many senior officers recognized the functional necessity of integration, they were equally aware that being forced to implement radical changes in manpower policy in a short span of time was antithetical to the professional interests of the armed forces. For example, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Organization, Major General Idwal Edwards, “voiced serious concerns about the timing and pace of the new policy.”¹⁶⁹ Similarly, the commandant of the Marine Corps, General Clifton D. Cates, expressed sympathies with the ideas of equality and integration but concluded with an opinion shared by many senior military officers: “Rapidly changing national policy in this respect through the armed forces is a dangerous path to pursue . . . should the time arise that non-segregation is accepted as a custom of the nation, this policy can be adopted without detriment by the national military establishment.”¹⁷⁰

Yet, in spite of his strong feelings, General Cates had no recourse but to honor the order of President Truman, his Commander-in-Chief. The Secretary of the Army, Kenneth Royall, was dismayed at the pace and depth of integration mandated by Truman,

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 159.

¹⁷⁰ Lanning, 223.

and resigned in protest. His successor, Gordon Gray, duly obeyed the president's orders and instituted manpower reforms in the military, although he found many of the army's senior officers to be “resistant” to the rapid changes in segregation policies.¹⁷¹ These changes imposed by Executive Order 9981 were essentially “forced on a reluctant Army”, and they occurred at a pace that was much faster than what the military leadership was prepared to accept.¹⁷²

Analysis

This case study has largely corroborated the theoretical predictions. When ethnic leaders with high capability and high legitimacy interact with military leaders who are inactive, the impetus for change would come from the ethnic leadership. The US military's initial attempts at instituting phased changes in ethnic policies in 1946 (through the military's Gillem Report) were rebuffed by the civilian government. Sustained pressure by civil rights groups and the threat of electoral defeat finally compelled Truman to yield to the demands of the ethnic community and to mandate rapid ethnic reforms in the armed forces.

This case study also supported the predictions that such socially-directed integration will proceed at a faster rate than what the military is prepared to accept. Military leaders were chiefly concerned with the efficiency of their organizations, and will insist on integration that occurs at an acceptable pace for the military. Civil rights advocates, on the other hand, saw an opportunity to use the military as a vehicle for the

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 224.

¹⁷² Records were reviewed by the author from the Harry Truman Presidential Library and Museum in Independence, MO, during a research trip on April 4, 2015.

extension of social justice, and will use their power at the ballot box to push for immediate and complete changes in ethnic-military manpower policies. Since, in this context, the electoral demands of civil rights activists were more influential to the civilian leadership than the professional concerns of the military, the government mandated policies that appeased the electorate but caused short-term organizational woes for the military.

This case study helps to polish the theory in two important ways. First, the theory had posited that ethnic groups that are “capable” can rely on their representation in senior levels of government or the threat of the ballot box to press the political leadership for ethnic reform in the armed forces. These formal institutions of advocacy were certainly used by the black leadership in America to a large extent—for instance, they employed the threat of “bloc voting” in key districts to pressure the political leadership for change. However, the US case study reveals that non-formal institutions of advocacy can also be used by ethnic groups to lobby for change. For example, the black leadership used the threat of civil disobedience—in the form of mass protests, demonstrations, and boycotts—to put pressure on the political leadership for ethnic reforms. The fact that the laws of the US permitted such civil disobedience to take place strengthened the capability of ethnic leaders, as it provided them with both electoral and non-electoral institutions to advocate for change. Thus, it may be necessary to take a more expansive view of the capability status of ethnic leaders. To the extent that the internal structures of a country (i.e. the nature of the polity and its laws) allow ethnic groups to utilize non-formal mechanisms to fight for their rights, these mechanisms should be factored into the assessment of ethnic

leaders' capability, in addition to the formal institutions of voting and political representation that had been stipulated in the theory.

Second, this case study refined the theoretical argument by alerting to the pitfalls of treating “the military” as a monolithic concept. In the theoretical discussion, it had been argued that socially-directed changes in ethnic policies will proceed at a faster rate than what “the military” is prepared to accept. In the US case study, while there were some military leaders who were strongly opposed to the government's policies, there were others who were strongly supportive of them (e.g. the differences in opinion between Royall and Gray). Hence, even though certain generalizations can be made about military preferences, it is also important to recognize that “the military” is not a monolithic entity and that significant differences in opinion can exist within the organization itself.

Quadrant 4: Military and Ethnic Leaderships
are both Driving Forces

Theory to be Tested

The theory is that if both military and ethnic leaders are driving forces, the impetus for change will come from both the military and ethnic leaderships. The political leadership is likely to adjudicate when conflicting demands arise from the two actors. Creative compromises in ethnic-military manpower policy are likely to occur between the military and ethnic leaderships. This will be tested using the case study of Israel in the 1970s.

Background to Israeli Case Study

The Druze leaders in Israel were driving forces in advocating for the integration of Druze soldiers in the 1970s. The following empirical study examines how ethnic and military leaderships will interact when both parties combine to drive ethnic reform, by reviewing the interactions between Druze leaders and the leadership of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in the 1970s.

The IDF leadership can be said to be a driving force for change since it had both high capabilities and high legitimacy for integrating ethnic soldiers in the 1970s. The high level of autonomy enjoyed by the Israeli military leadership was evident since the inception of the Jewish state in 1948. Israel's first Prime Minister, Ben-Gurion, firmly believed that “officers had to be given a domain of professional autonomy in matters concerning the operation of their units,” and that the political leadership had to trust the “independent judgment, responsibility, and accountability” of senior military officers.¹⁷³ As such, Ben-Gurion gave senior officers “full authority” over the policies of the military “in order to hold them accountable for their units' performance,” laying the groundwork for a military leadership that enjoyed significant autonomy in its ability to make independent organizational and doctrinal decisions, a characteristic that is maintained even till the present day.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ Peled, “Soldiers Apart,” 315.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 318.

The Impetus for Change

As described in chapter 3, the early 1970s marked the turning point for Druze servicemen in the IDF. Due to a fortuitous confluence of events, they managed to demonstrate their loyalty to the state and prove their military value through successful participation in combat operations for the IDF Minority Unit. These successes provided compelling reasons for both the military and ethnic leaderships to advocate for the integration of Druze soldiers into the IDF. The advocacy undertaken by Druze leaders to promote the integration of their kinsmen into the IDF was described in detail in the preceding chapter.

For the military, there were strong functional reasons to press for greater participation of Druze servicemen in the armed forces. The IDF was desperate for manpower after the 1967 and 1973 wars, and senior commanders calculated that in order to face up to the external threats confronting Israel, the military had to triple in size.¹⁷⁵ Thus, military leaders recognized that the policy of restricting the numbers of ethnic soldiers admitted into and promoted in the IDF was detrimental to the professional goals of the organization, and sought to reform the policy. For Druze soldiers in particular, their participation in successful combat operations in the early 1970s convinced military leaders that the Druze were loyal and that they were good combat soldiers who could become valuable assets for the IDF.¹⁷⁶ Hence, beginning in 1972, the military abolished restrictions and allowed Druze soldiers to serve in IDF formations that were previously

¹⁷⁵ Jacob Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967-1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 173.

¹⁷⁶ Gabriel Ben-Dor, *The Druzes in Israel: A Political Study* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1979), 132.

closed off to them—including signals, artillery, and commando units. This was the beginning of the process of ethnic reform for Druze soldiers, a process initiated by the IDF leadership and encouraged by the forceful advocacy of Druze leaders. Further changes would occur as a result of the mutually reinforcing interaction between the military and ethnic leaderships, both of whom were determined to see greater participation of Druze servicemen in the IDF.

However, the road to integration was not a smooth and simple one, and the marriage between military and ethnic leaders in promoting Druze integration was riddled with problems right from the beginning. Military leaders were motivated by professional interests and were determined to promote integration in a way that optimized the strength of the armed forces. Ethnic leaders, on the other hand, were motivated by community interests and sought to promote integration in a way that maximized the rights of their kinsmen in the armed forces. These fundamentally divergent motivations for promoting Druze integration caused tensions to emerge between the two actors regarding how the integration were to take place.

Conflicting Demands from Ethnic and Military Leaderships

Ethnic and military leaders disagreed in two major areas: first, the pace of integration; and second, the nature of integration. For military leaders, the pace of integration was an important consideration—integration, if it occurred, had to take place in a phased and controlled manner in order to give the armed forces sufficient time to

adapt.¹⁷⁷ According to IDF leaders, “integration for ethnic minorities will not happen overnight . . . it will take time.”¹⁷⁸ Hence, the military leadership argued that segregated minority units would need to exist in the interim period, before ethnic soldiers were slowly phased into composite units. Military commanders felt that “it was desirable to have separate units at first to improve the supervision of ethnic soldiers,” before implementing full-fledged integration.¹⁷⁹

Ethnic leaders, on the other hand, were impatient for results and demanded immediate and complete integration. After the notable success of Druze soldiers from 1968 to 1970, Druze leaders decided to capitalize on this moment of opportunity and accelerated their advocacy efforts at a time when the loyalty of the Druze was widely lauded by the media and the public. The Druze League—an organization of educated Druze leaders who fought for the rights of their kinsmen—mobilized its youthful cohorts to campaign for immediate integration, and sent out a flurry of letters and appeals to government ministries and the media.¹⁸⁰ The demands by Druze leaders for immediate and complete integration were at odds with the desires of military leaders to have a controlled and phased integration of ethnic minorities into the IDF. This section will examine how these conflicting demands were eventually resolved.

¹⁷⁷ Recall that this was the exact dilemma faced by US military leaders in the aftermath of World War II. While they recognized the functional necessity of integrating black soldiers into the US military, they were equally aware that being forced to implement radical changes in a short amount of time would be antithetical to the professional interests of the military organization.

¹⁷⁸ Jack Katzenell, “Minorities in the IDF,” *IDF Journal* 4, no. 3 (Fall 1987): 42.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁸⁰ Krebs, 76.

The second area of conflict between ethnic and military leaders revolved around the issue of conscripting women. Military leaders insisted on the conscription of women into the armed forces in order to boost the scarce manpower resources of the IDF, particularly at a time when the IDF had to triple in size in order defend Israel against external threats. However, many of the marginalized ethnicities, including the Druze and the Orthodox Jews, objected to the conscription of their women on religious grounds. They were convinced that the modesty of their women would be violated in the secular military and that the removal of women from the traditional household would undermine their way of life. Thus, in a most unusual temporary coalition, Druze and Orthodox leaders joined forces to protest the military's efforts to conscript women.¹⁸¹ This set the stage for a showdown between military leaders who were determined to conscript women in order to boost the numbers of the armed forces, and ethnic leaders who were opposed to such conscription as they believed it would undermine their religion and way of life.

Role of the Political Leadership

The conflicting demands from ethnic and military leaderships placed the Israeli political leadership in a difficult position—it was caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. On the one hand, political leaders recognized the importance of providing the military leadership with the autonomy it needed to maximize the strength of the armed forces in order to defend Israel against external threats. This was a tradition that had been strictly adhered to since the inception of Israel, when Ben-Gurion gave the military leadership “full authority” to make independent organizational and doctrinal decisions. It

¹⁸¹ Peled, *A Question of Loyalty*, 133.

was thus appealing for political leaders to continue to allow IDF leaders to determine ethnic reform according to their own professional judgments, free from social concerns.

However, political leaders in Israel—unlike those in South Africa—were also under significant pressure from ethnic leaders. In particular, the 1969 Knesset (Parliament) elections had shaken ruling leaders out of their complacency. A relatively unknown party, Rakah, which campaigned on a platform of halting the discriminatory practices of the state against ethnic minorities, had made unprecedented inroads that year amongst the Druze and the Arab population as a whole, at the expense of the ruling Labor Party.¹⁸² Emboldened by the success of Rakah, Druze leaders came forward with renewed vigor to press for the integration of Druze soldiers into the IDF. A prominent ethnic leader summed up the frustrations of the Druze community when he asked, “Why do we not have the courage to fully admit that the Druze who are brothers-in-arms with the Jews deserve equal rights, without being ashamed of such an admission?”¹⁸³ Faced with an increasingly restive Druze population, the government realized it had to find ways to satisfy the community. In 1970, Prime Minister Golda Meir announced that “the Druze would be administratively . . . Israelis in every respect”—a vague declaration that nonetheless laid the groundwork for eventual concessions made by the political leadership to ethnic leaders.¹⁸⁴

The Israeli political authorities had to tread a fine line between the demands of the military leadership and the wishes of the ethnic leadership. Political leaders recognized

¹⁸² Krebs, 77.

¹⁸³ Katzenell, 40.

¹⁸⁴ Ben-Dor, 68.

that ethnic leaders' demands for immediate and complete integration were impractical; yet, they had to find ways to appease the Druze community. Therefore, in exchange for their support on the phased integration of ethnic soldiers, the state decided to grant the Druze the right to being recognized as a "millet," which is an autonomous religious community. This standing— which had been denied to the Druze under the Ottomans and the British—carried with it the right to supervise communal religious endowments and to maintain religious courts. Over the course of several years, Druze religious courts were set up and judges appointed, and the Druze community reveled in their newly-found status as an autonomous religious community.¹⁸⁵ In return, Druze leaders dropped their calls for immediate and complete integration of Druze soldiers in the IDF—a relatively small price to pay in exchange for gaining greater autonomy in managing the affairs of their community.

The issue of conscripting women was a further example of how compromise was struck when conflicts of interest occurred. The Israeli political leadership decided to strike a quid-pro-quo with the leaders of the Druze and Orthodox communities: in return for their support for conscripting Druze and Orthodox women into the IDF, the Israeli government would implement a proposed law that exempted ethnic youth who had committed themselves to religious study from joining the military. This was a policy that was strongly supported by some of the more conservative Druze and Orthodox leaders who had feared that mandatory service would reduce the number of religious adherents in their community.¹⁸⁶ This was a creative compromise that resolved the diametrically

¹⁸⁵ Landau, 13-15.

¹⁸⁶ Peled, "Soldiers Apart," 196.

opposing interests of the military and the marginalized ethnicities and produced a net positive outcome for both parties.

Negotiating Outcome

The result of the horse-trading between the military, ethnic and political leaderships was a positive net outcome for all parties involved. The military leadership was able to accomplish its functional goals of phased integration and the conscription of ethnic women into the IDF; the ethnic leadership managed to elevate the official status of the Druze community and acquire exemptions for ethnic youth who were pursuing religious studies; and the political leadership was able to appease its ethnic constituents without compromising the autonomy of the military leadership to make professional decisions that would maximize the strength of the IDF.

Over the course of the 1970s, the phased integration of Druze soldiers in the IDF proceeded as planned. Beginning in February 1972, the armed forces decided to allow a limited number of Druze soldiers into all of its branches except the air force and intelligence. According to an IDF general, “if they [the ethnic soldiers] succeed in these units, more doors will be opened.”¹⁸⁷ As the ranks of Druze soldiers burgeoned, long-held suspicions and old barriers began crumbling for Druze officers as well. During the mid- to late 1970s, more Druze officers were sent for advanced military courses in the School for Staff and Command. In 1978, Druze officers began to receive command positions over Jewish units after completing these courses, heralding the first time that minority officers held command over majority Jewish soldiers. Since the 1970s, the

¹⁸⁷ Katzenell, 42.

highest-ranking Druze in the IDF had been a Brigadier General, and Druze officers continue to be put in command of Jewish brigades, divisions, and elite units.¹⁸⁸

Analysis

There is strong empirical support for the theory. When ethnic soldiers have demonstrated their loyalty and proven their combat worth in successful war efforts, the functional demands of the military leadership in integrating these ethnic soldiers would coincide with the democratic demands of ethnic leaders for more equal treatment of their kinsmen. Hence, this mutually reinforcing interaction between the military and ethnic leaderships will drive military manpower reform in the armed forces.

When conflicts of interest occurred between the military and ethnic leaderships, these two dominant actors were able to mitigate each other's influence and reach solutions that were mutually acceptable. This is in sharp contrast to the South African and US case studies, where an asymmetrical balance of power between the military and ethnic leaderships allowed the dominant actor to impose its wishes where conflict of interests occurred. For example, the South African military was able to ignore the interests of the white population and proceed with rapid ethnic integration in the SADF in the 1970s, while the US government, under pressure from civil rights groups, mandated the military to implement changes in manpower policy at a faster rate than what the military was prepared to accept in the late 1940s. In the Israeli case study, the fact that both military and ethnic leaders were influential forced the political leadership to play a delicate balancing role and to generate creative compromises between the two parties.

¹⁸⁸ Ben-Dor, 147.

However, this case study also enhanced the theoretical discussion by raising three important issues that had not been initially anticipated. Firstly, the case of Druze and Orthodox leaders jointly opposing the conscription of their women into the IDF showed the potential for ethnic groups to form alliances—even unusual ones—to strengthen their bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the state. The implication is that the capability status of ethnic leaders is not necessarily organically determined—it can fluctuate depending on the extent of external alliance-building. Hence, ethnic groups that are weak (i.e. low capability) are not forever locked in a hopeless position when it comes to pressing for ethnic reform. They can dramatically increase their political voice if they form alliances, even temporary ones, with other ethnic groups to jointly lobby the government for ethnic reform in the armed forces.

Secondly, this case study cautions against treating ethnic groups as monolithic entities. The theoretical argument is that leaders of discriminated communities will necessarily want to fight for the rights of their kinsmen by demanding that their youth be treated fairly in the armed forces. The example of the Druze community partially challenges this assertion: while most Druze leaders had wanted their youth to be treated in the same non-discriminatory manner as Jewish youth were, there were some Druze leaders (the more conservative and religious ones) who did not want their youth to be treated like ordinary citizens. Instead, they demanded that their youth be exempt from conscription in order to preserve their religious purity. The lesson learned is that ethnic groups are often divided from within over the problem of integration in the military. The decision of ethnic leaders to cooperate with the military in matters concerning military manpower policy usually triggers opposition from within the ethnic group. Hence, it is

important to recognize that ethnic groups often do not present monolithic demands. Nonetheless, it is possible to make certain generalizations and show the general trend of ethnic leaders pushing for fair and equal treatment of their youth in the military, even if there may be some members within the groups who diverge from the majority opinion.

Thirdly, the Israel case study showed that negotiations between the ethnic, military and political leaderships often involve issues outside the ambit of military manpower policy. In the first place, it must be noted that negotiations only take place when there is a balance of power between the ethnic and military leaderships. When there is asymmetrical power balance—such as in the US and South Africa case studies—the dominant power often does not even negotiate, but instead simply imposes its wishes on the other. In the case of Israel, when there was a deadlock between the ethnic and military leaderships (e.g. disagreement about the pace of integration), one side conceded on the issue in exchange for benefits outside the domain of military manpower policy (e.g. the recognition of the Druze as an autonomous religious community). This is surprising because one would have expected that when two equally powerful actors bargain, they would achieve a compromise outcome that is in the middle of two extreme positions. In the Israel case study, however, the military leadership managed to completely achieve what it had bargained for (phased integration and the conscription of women), yet the ethnic leadership was still satisfied by completely conceding on these issues in exchange for benefits in other domains (e.g. elevation of religious autonomy).

There are two reasons why these surprising outcomes were attained. The first reason is that some of the issues that the ethnic and military leaderships disagreed on were essentially “indivisible” issues (e.g. whether women should be conscripted). In such

zero-sum bargaining conditions, one side has to eventually lose as there is no middle outcome. Fortunately, the entry of the political leadership as a mediator that has vested interest in appeasing both military and ethnic leaderships allows side payments to be dished out to the party that concedes on the issues.¹⁸⁹ These side payments are usually concessions made by the political leadership in domains outside of military manpower policy (e.g. the elevation of religious autonomy of the Druze), but they serve to ensure that both ethnic and military leaderships are both able to achieve a net positive outcome even under zero-sum bargaining conditions.

The second reason why negotiations often involved issues outside the ambit of military manpower policy is that shrewd ethnic leaders may initiate negotiations on the issue of military service without having the overriding goal of seeking compromises in the realm of military manpower policy. Instead, they may use military service as a bargaining chip to extracting concessions from the state in other domains that are important for the ethnic community. Rationally-minded ethnic leaders are aware that they can gain the favor of their kinsmen, no matter whether the end-result is an improvement of the fate of ethnic soldiers in the armed forces, or an improvement in the overall standing of the ethnic community. Therefore, if they perceive insurmountable obstacles or the presence of “indivisible” issues in their negotiations for ethnic reforms, they may switch strategies and use the military service of their kinsmen as a bargaining chip to

¹⁸⁹ The concepts of “indivisible issues” and “side payments” were originally developed by James Fearon to provide rationalist explanations for the causes of war. They are applied in this context to explain why ethnic, military and political leaders arrived at outcomes outside the negotiating domain of military manpower policy. James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanation for War,” *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 379-414.

extract concessions from the state in other domains that are important for their community, and in so doing gain the support of their kinsmen and maintain their positions as leaders of the ethnic group.

Conclusion

The case studies of the Soviet Union, South Africa, the United States, and Israel largely corroborated the predictions made in the second stage of the theory. These four cases demonstrated that ethnic, military, and political leaders behave in a way that is predicted by the rationalist framework of the theory. At the same time, the case studies suggested an expansion of the theoretical model to account for additional variables, raising questions that the theory did not anticipate. The deviations from the stylized portrayal of the interaction between the three principal actors helped to refine the theory and make it more robust. While the theoretical framework could not address every single aspect of the four cases, it proved to be a useful lens through which to view how ethnic, military and political leaders respond to institutional structures and incentives in different ways to negotiate the size and character of ethnic participation in the armed forces.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED

This thesis started with a simple but fascinating puzzle: why do some states continue to discriminate against certain ethnic groups in their armed forces, while others have moved away from such practices? To answer this question, it introduced a two-stage theory explaining how ethnic-military manpower policy is amended. In the first stage, it examined how ethnic and military leaders decide whether to press the political leadership for ethnic reform in the armed forces. It was argued that both ethnic and military leaders would push for change only when they have high capabilities and high legitimacy. In the second stage of the theory, the thesis examined how political, ethnic and military leaders interact to amend ethnic-military manpower policy, based on their different preference functions. Ethnic leaders are primarily concerned with maintaining their positions as leaders of their ethnic community; military leaders with the combat effectiveness of the armed forces; and political leaders with the preservation of political power. When these three actors—each with varying degrees of power and having their own set of rational calculations—come together at the negotiating table, their differing capabilities and legitimacy combine to speed or block shifts in the military utilization of subordinate ethnic soldiers, according to the theoretical framework proposed.

The remainder of this concluding chapter contains three sections. The first reviews the roles played by the three principal actors—political, ethnic and military leaders—based on the main elements of the theory and the refinements that were brought to light by the case study analyses. The second section then explains the significance of the findings and highlights some of the theory's key implications. The third and final

section suggests areas where further research can be conducted to supplement the findings that have been presented here.

Rethinking the Roles of Political, Ethnic, and Military Leaders

Politicians, military commanders, and ethnic leaders who are involved in deciding the fate of ethnic soldiers in the armed forces may be confronted with the following daunting questions: If integrated into the military, will young ethnic soldiers serve their country loyally, or will they become Trojan horses? Are the costs of assimilating these ethnic youth into the armed forces higher than the benefits that can be reaped? Why should the leaders themselves be spending political capital fighting to change military manpower policy, and how does the integration of ethnic soldiers align with their self-interest? And if they decide to press for change, how will the other two principal actors in the negotiation process respond to their overtures? These are complex questions that call for more than a single answer. Politicians, ethnic, and military leaders will have to find solutions that are in line with their own interests and agenda.

Although political leaders have a monopoly on formal authority within the executive branch, they are still constrained by the limitations of formal organizations and bureaucratic politics. In order to stay in power, they must find ways to appease their constituents, particularly if the constituents are influential ethnic groups who can use the ballot box to remove them from office, or if the constituents are powerful military elites who can forcibly overthrow them. As a result, political leaders must nudge, entice, and negotiate with military and ethnic leaders in the process of amending military manpower policy. As the case studies have shown, political leaders assume the most decisive role

when there is a balance of power between the ethnic and military leaderships.¹⁹⁰ When highly influential ethnic and military leaders reach a deadlock on the issue of ethnic reform, political leaders may broker creative compromises between the two parties, or purchase the acquiescence of one of the conflicting parties through side payments, thereby allowing all parties to register net positive gains from an otherwise zero-sum bargaining situation.

This diagnosis should not be misread. To observe that politicians must bargain with ethnic and military leaders is not to suggest that political leaders in all countries are unavoidably held hostage to the whims and desires of military services or ethnic groups. In fact, as the Soviet Union case study demonstrated, political leaders in autocratic states do assume an overwhelmingly dominant role in determining ethnic-military manpower policy. In such autocratic polities, both the ethnic and military leaderships are weak and thus inactive in pushing for change.¹⁹¹ Thus, the primary architect of ethnic-military manpower policy is the political leader, who determines the fate of ethnic soldiers in the armed forces without being constrained by pressures from military or ethnic leaders.

Stalin's Russia and Mao's China are examples of states that fit into this typology, where the autocratic political leader is the primary driving force behind ethnic-military

¹⁹⁰ This finding is consistent with Arnold Kanter's research that indicates that the US political leadership becomes most influential in affecting budgetary policy in the US armed forces when there is a balance of power between the different services in the armed forces. Arnold Kanter, *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

¹⁹¹ This is another manifestation of the argument that political leaders assume the most salient role when there is a balance of power between the ethnic and military leaderships. In this case, both these actors are equally weak, hence political leaders become the primary architect of ethnic-military manpower policy.

manpower policy. In such cases, political leaders are likely to determine ethnic policy with the ultimate goal of preserving their own political power. If the fear of internal rebellion by ethnic minorities is high, then political leaders are unlikely to integrate ethnic soldiers to minimize the chances of having a trained and armed populace rise against them. However, if the fear of foreign aggression is predominant, then the parochial interests of politicians to stay in power are likely to converge with the professional interests of military commanders to maximize military strength—since politicians recognize that they cannot stay in power if their state is swallowed up by an external aggressor. In such instances, if the integration of ethnic soldiers is perceived to maximize military strength, then the autocratic political leader will conceivably implement such changes, at least for the duration when external threats remain high.

The case studies also refined our understanding of the role played by ethnic leaders in amending military manpower policy. Ethnic leaders are motivated by the desire to maintain their position as leaders of their ethnic community, and to do so they must fight for the rights of their kinsmen. They have a variety of tools at their disposal to lobby the political and military leaderships for reforms in the armed forces. They can use both electoral and non-electoral (e.g. protests, demonstrations, boycotts) institutions to press the political leadership for change. They can also increase their negotiating leverage against the state by building alliances—even temporary ones—with leaders of other ethnic groups. When it comes to negotiating with military leaders, ethnic leaders often possess an important trump card—they have the ability to either motivate or dissuade their kinsmen from active participation in the armed forces. This creates incentives for military

leaders to build goodwill with ethnic leaders—even weak ones—in order to ensure that a continual stream of well-motivated ethnic soldiers will participate in the armed forces.

The research has also indicated an interesting aspect of ethnic leaders' behavior. In some cases, highly capable ethnic leaders may initiate negotiations on military service with political and military leaders without having the overriding goal of seeking compromises in the realm of military manpower policy. Instead, they use the track record of ethnic soldiers as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from the state in other domains that are important for their community. This is particularly relevant if they perceive that certain negotiating issues are indivisible, hence making compromises with the military or political leadership unlikely. In such cases, they may maneuver to extract side payments from the state in exchange for their acquiescence. This shows that shrewd ethnic leaders can be flexible in their negotiating strategy, especially if they perceive that there are other ways of improving their community's overall standing, which enable them to gain the support of their kinsmen and hence maintain their position as leaders of the ethnic group.

Finally, what role do military leaders play in amending ethnic-military manpower policy? It was assumed that they would press for the integration of ethnic soldiers if they perceived that such integration would maximize the strength of the armed forces. However, the case studies had refined this argument and provided a more nuanced interpretation of the issue. "Professional" military leaders do not blindly follow the mantra of maximizing military strength in order to stave off foreign aggression. Instead, they constantly assess the level of external threats facing the country relative to the level of internal threats, and make decisions on ethnic integration based on this evaluation.

For example, in the case of South Africa, military leaders assessed that the predominant threat facing the country in the 1970s was foreign aggression, hence there were strong functional incentives to integrate black soldiers into the SADF in order to ensure the survival of the South African state. The pace of ethnic integration accelerated when there was an increase in external threat perception. This was in contrast to the Soviet case study, where the salient concern was the fear of internal rebellion by ethnic minorities. Hence, the discrimination of ethnic soldiers was perpetuated at the expense of maximizing the strength of the Soviet military, in order to ensure that potentially rebellious ethnic groups could not revolt, and the internal stability of the country was preserved. The Soviet Union continued to perceive that arming the subordinate ethnic groups could be dangerous to the domestic status quo. The contrasting experiences of South Africa and the Soviet Union show that military leaders—like political leaders—always balance the external and internal dimensions of national security when assessing whether to integrate ethnic soldiers into the armed forces.

This observation is particularly significant because it modifies the seminal conception of the professional military officer described by Samuel Huntington.¹⁹² Huntington argued that professional officers are rationally disciplined and strive to maximize military strength so that they can fulfill their responsibility of defending the state against external threats. He ignored the internal dimension of national security (e.g. domestic political order, rebellions, insurrections) and argued that domestic problems are not the concern of the military.¹⁹³ However, the case studies showed that professional

¹⁹² See Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 310.

military officers do evaluate the level of internal threats relative to the level of external threats, and make decisions concerning ethnic integration contingent upon this evaluation. Thus, the professional military officer is not one who simply adheres to the overriding imperative of maximizing military strength—he is capable of much more sophisticated threat assessment than what Huntington gives him credit for, and military leaders calibrate the composition of the military to best handle the perceived threats facing the country.

Implications of the Theory

What is the significance of the conclusions that have been drawn? With the rise of new multiethnic states in the post-Cold War world, many of which are experiencing sharp tensions among racial or religious groups, the issue of ethnic-military manpower policy has received renewed attention. Today, politicians, ethnic and military leaders around the world continue to struggle to find a role for ethnic soldiers in the armed forces of multiethnic states. In Iraq, one of the most daunting challenges that confronted US planners in winning the peace was building a national Iraqi military that integrated Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds into a cohesive fighting force.¹⁹⁴ However, as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) continues to seize territories in Iraq today and target Shiites for execution, ethnic relations in the country remain fractured and little progress has been

¹⁹⁴ See Mary Baker, “Winning the Peace? An Examination into building an Afghan National Army (ANA) and New Iraqi Army (NIA)” (Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, 19 March 2004); Dawn Brancati, “Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?” *The Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 7-21.

made in integrating the various ethnicities within the armed forces.¹⁹⁵ In the next ten years, whether Iraqi officials can succeed in building a strong, unified national military depends largely on how politicians, military, and ethnic leaders negotiate the tricky issue of military manpower policy, based on their different capabilities and legitimacy.

Beyond Iraq, the theory and arguments in this thesis have several important implications, and three of them will be highlighted here. The first implication has to do with the domestic political structure of a multiethnic state and the way military manpower policy is amended within the state. Based on the negotiating model that has been proposed, we can discern four types of political regimes and predict the corresponding outcomes in ethnic reforms in each of them.

¹⁹⁵ Alissa Rubin, “Questions Rebels use to tell Sunni from Shiite,” *The New York Times*, June 24, 2014. This observation is consistent with the theory that has been suggested in this thesis. At this moment in Iraq, politicians and military leaders perceive internal threats to be more salient than external threats, hence there is little incentive to integrate ethnic soldiers now as the costs are high relative to the benefits. Paradoxically, if external threats against Iraq increase (e.g. a hostile Iran), then we can expect a faster pace of ethnic integration in the national Iraqi military, in order to build military power.

Table 9. Political Regimes and Likely Outcomes of Military Manpower Policy

Characteristic of Military and Ethnic Leaders	Corresponding Regime type	Historical Examples	Nature of Change	Role of Political Leadership	Outcome of change in policy
Mil. inactive Eth. inactive	Dictatorship	USSR Iraq (Saddam era)	No impetus for change	Assumes decisive role	No change
Mil. driving force Eth. inactive	Militarized Autocracies	South Africa (apartheid era) Pakistan	Military-directed change	Yields to military demands	Faster than society can accept
Mil. inactive Eth. driving force	Liberal Democracies	USA France	Socially-directed change	Yields to social pressure	Faster than military can accept
Mil. driving force Eth. driving force	Militarized Democracies	Israel Thailand	Mutually-reinforcing interaction	Adjudicator / Mediator	Creative compromises brokered

Source: Created by author.

As table 9 indicates, the characteristics of military and ethnic leaders (column 1) are often a reflection of the regime type (column 2) in which they are embedded. The domestic regime type creates the structural conditions within which politicians, military, and ethnic leaders operate, and therefore it can be a good predictor of how military manpower policy will evolve within a particular multiethnic state. Although this typology is not meant to be deterministic, it is a useful way of understanding the impact of political structures on particular policy outcomes.¹⁹⁶ Variations in regime type can help to account for the deviations in policy outcomes, and can partially explain why marginalized ethnicities are integrated in the armed forces of some multiethnic states, but not in others.

The second implication of the research is that it is important in a multiethnic state for both the military and ethnic leaderships to be given a stake in the evolution of military

¹⁹⁶ Paul Pierson provides a more general explanation of how different political structures can affect military policy. Paul Pierson, "When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change," *World Politics* 45, no. 4 (July 1993): 595-628.

manpower policy. The South African and the US case studies had illustrated the problems of having either the military or the ethnic leadership become too dominant in determining ethnic reform in the armed forces. In such cases, the pace and the nature of reform become skewed, to the detriment of at least one of the parties involved. Worse, when neither the military nor the ethnic leadership has a stake in amending military manpower policy (e.g. Soviet Union), the process gets completely dominated by the political leadership, to serve their own vested interests. This produces a highly suboptimal outcome for all the other parties involved—military leaders, ethnic leaders, and ethnic soldiers. In contrast, when all parties have a stake in the bargaining process (e.g. Israel), negotiations will often lead to net positive gains for all parties involved, as creative compromises are offered and side payments provided. Governments that give both the ethnic and military leaderships a stake in the evolution of military manpower policy can simultaneously enhance the effectiveness of the military as well as alleviate some of the tensions between the state and its subordinate ethnic groups.

The third implication of the study has to do with how ethnic soldiers can seek integration into the armed forces. The case studies have shown that it is the combination of proven and anticipated military utility that gives ethnic soldiers the best chance of being integrated into the military. By performing well and earning battlefield successes, ethnic soldiers provide the legitimacy for ethnic and military leaders to advocate for their long-term integration. Those that fail to do so will find themselves being called to arms when the country needs them in war—and then discharged from combat positions after the war, with no prospects for integration and advancement in the postwar period. Ethnic soldiers who want to fight against discrimination should recognize that war against a

foreign power is often the best opportunity to prove themselves. If they do well, this makes them seem more valuable as military recruits thereafter, especially if more recruits are needed.

Issues for Further Research

In this thesis, the “most likely” research design was used to conduct the empirical study, examining in depth several case studies in which a hypothesized causal relationship was believed most likely to be found. While this detailed qualitative approach helped us enter the minds of decision-makers and captured the elements of strategic interaction between the various actors, it nonetheless suffers from a lack of breadth. Because the sample is a small one, the findings cannot be easily generalized to some larger set of unexamined cases. Thus, the conclusions that are drawn should not be hastily applied without further study. The ideal complement to the case study approach would have been statistical analysis that draws on a larger sample of cases. However, given the reluctance of multiethnic militaries to release sensitive information pertaining to ethnic soldiers, it is very difficult to obtain a large volume of reliable data, making statistical analysis an extremely daunting task. In the future, as more information on ethnic minorities in multiethnic militaries become available, scholars can begin to assemble datasets and perform large-*N* analyses on issues relating to military manpower policy in multiethnic states.

Second, in this thesis, most of the theoretical concepts have been presented in a binary form—high versus low capabilities, high versus low legitimacy, driving force versus inactive in pushing for change. This binary representation—commonly used in the social sciences—allows for simplification and clarity, but it comes at the cost of realism.

In reality, distributions of capabilities and legitimacy tend to be continuous rather than discrete, hence the binary representations that are proposed do not accurately capture the complexities of real-life interactions. Additionally, these binary representations focus on the more extreme ends of the spectrum, ignoring a conceptual “middle ground” that is neither high nor low. A more sophisticated study could use the theoretical framework that is presented here as a starting point to develop a formal model that is structured on a continuous spectrum (e.g. “capabilities” and “legitimacy” on a sliding scale), providing a more comprehensive explanation of how different actors will behave at each stage of the spectrum.

Third, the study has focused on positive changes in ethnic-military manpower policy—that is, the increased integration of ethnic soldiers into the armed forces. This is because ethnic soldiers that are discriminated against frequently start out at the lowest possible position in the military, hence any change for them would almost always entail an upward revision of their prospects in the armed forces. However, it is conceivable that ethnic soldiers can start out being treated fairly equally in the armed forces, but because of exogenous factors such as regime change, lose the trust of political or military leaders and end up suffering increased discrimination. In such cases, changes in ethnic policy will be negative in nature. Further research can enhance our understanding of how negative changes in ethnic-military manpower policy are brought about. It is likely that the mechanisms that promote negative change will be similar to those that promote positive change—involving high capabilities and high legitimacy of the relevant actors, but channeled in the opposite direction. It would be useful to examine how the process of negative change differs from—or is similar to—the process of positive change, and whether

the theoretical framework presented here can be meaningfully applied to analyze cases where ethnic soldiers become increasingly discriminated against in the armed forces.

Lastly, discrimination in the armed forces can occur for a variety of factors beyond one's ethnicity. Prejudice against gays and women are still common in many militaries today, and such discrimination can take place either overtly (state sanctioned) or implicitly. It would be useful to explore if the theory in this thesis can also be applied to explain how other groups of discriminated personnel are eventually integrated into the military. For example, it may be worth considering whether the recent repeal of the "Don't Ask Don't Tell" policy in the US followed similar bargaining dynamics, where pressure from gay movement leaders and special interest groups eventually compelled politicians and military leaders to end the discriminatory practice in the armed forces. Given that this repeal was mandated by the civilian establishment as a result of electoral or legislative pressures, did the integration of gays in the US military occur at a faster pace than what the military leadership can accept? How would the nature and pace of such integration be different if it occurred in other political regimes such as dictatorships or militarized autocracies? Further research will illuminate whether the theoretical framework in this thesis can be applied to other forms of interest group advocacy in the armed forces, and whether the dynamics between politicians, military leaders and interest group leaders will be similar to what had been described here for ethnic issues.

The thesis demonstrated the value of an approach that combines model-building and empirical case studies. We learn the applicability and the limits of the hypotheses, and we enrich our understanding of key military dynamics in the contemporary world. The proposed theory was not intended to completely explain every minor alteration of

ethnic-military manpower policy in multiethnic states. What it can do is explain why some states continue to discriminate against certain ethnic groups in their armed forces, while others have moved away from such practices. As thousands of ethnic soldiers around the world today continue to struggle in discriminatory military organizations, it is increasingly important for academics and policymakers alike to find solutions that can improve their fate in the armed forces. This research clearly suggested that a diligent study of the motivations and capabilities of different actors within the state system, and the way they negotiate with one another, is the first step towards understanding how the lives of ethnic soldiers can be changed in multiethnic militaries.

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